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V. Criminal Law and Procedure
A. Federal Arraignment and Entry of Plea-Zamora v.
United States, 397 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1968); Castro v.
United States, 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968);
Gomez v. United States, 396 F.2d 323 (9th
Cir. 1968); Jones v. United States, 384
F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967).
Several recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit have served to inter-
pret and further define the Heiden Rule,1 a rule of criminal procedure
unique to the Ninth Circuit, based upon a construction of Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 Rule 11 requires that the
presiding officer at a federal criminal arraignment, before he accepts
the plea of guilty by the accused, determine that the plea was made
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea. The Heiden Rule grants to a prisoner an
automatic vacation of the sentence imposed at his arraignment when
he alleges at a subsequent proceeding3 that his plea was involuntarily
entered and when the record of his arraignment shows noncompliance
with Rule 11. This rule of procedure is to be contrasted with the "tra-
ditional view" and the "modified traditional view." Both of these
views grant an evidentiary hearing to the prisoner rather than vacate
his sentence,4 with the different procedural consequence that the
1 Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
2 FED. R. Csnv. P. 11. At the time of the Heiden decision, Rule 11
read, so far as is relevant, as follows: "The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the
plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.
." The rule was amended in 1966 to the effect that a positive duty was
placed on the presiding judge to engage in a verbal colloquy with the ac-
cused so as to better understand the accused's comprehension of the matter
and thus to be in a better position to determine voluntariness. The amend-
ment, however, is quite irrelevant to this discussion since the traditional
view still exists that technical non-compliance with Rule 11 entitles the ac-
cused to no more than a hearing at which time the voluntariness of the plea
can be determined.
3 The normal method is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which pro-
vides for a hearing for a prisoner upon a motion which alleges that the sen-
tence imposed was i) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States; (ii) without jurisdiction; (iii) in excess of the maximum penalty; or
(iv) otherwise subject to collateral attack, and whose record is not conclu-
sive against him.
4 E.g., Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1968); Halliday v.
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former puts the burden of proof on the issue of voluntariness on the
prisoner5 while the latter shifts that burden to the government once
noncompliance with Rule 11 is established.6
Subsequent cases have served to mold the Heiden Rule to its
present form. The rule has become nonretroactive. 7  One case has
held that compliance with Rule 11 does not necessarily preclude a
subsequent inquiry as to matters outside the record of the
arraignment. 8 On the other hand, in other situations, compliance with
Rule 11 has been held to eliminate completely the necessity for future
proceedings questioning the validity of the plea.9 In order to define
the present application of the Heiden Rule, the background, develop-
ment, and modifications will each, in turn, be explored.
Background
Before the implementation of the Heiden Rule, all circuits were
in accord on the general proposition10 that technical noncompliance
with Rule 11 was not fatal to the sentence imposed so long as the
plea was in fact voluntarily entered with full knowledge of the nature
of the charge and an understanding of its consequences.11 The pro-
cedure traditionally has been to grant a hearing, upon a proper motion,
on the issue of whether or not the plea was in fact voluntarily entered.
If the record were not conclusive, the majority of the circuits would
place the burden of proof on the prisoner to show that his plea was
involuntary.12 If he succeeded, his sentence would be vacated; if he
failed, his sentence would continue. A minority of circuits, including
the Ninth Circuit, placed the burden of proof on the issue of volun-
tariness on the government once noncompliance with Rule 11 was
established.13 In either event, the procedure did not interrupt the
United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967); Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d
23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881 (1967); Brokaw v. United States, 368
F.2d 508 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1957).
6 Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961).
7 Zamora v. United States, 397 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1968); Gomez v.
United States, 396 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1968); Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d
345 (9th Cir. 1968).
s Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967).
9 Compare McClure v. United States, 398 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1968), with
Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
10 By "the general proposition" is meant only the question whether a
hearing should be granted, rather than the Ninth Circuit's practice, under
Heiden, of vacating the sentence.
11 E.g., Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1962) (overruled
sub silentio by Heiden); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957).
12 See United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1957) for a
statement of the rule.
Is Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961), citing United
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sentence imposed at the arraignment. Upon a finding against the
prisoner, he returned to jail.
The procedure of merely granting a hearing, herein termed the
traditional view, is presently the position of all circuits other than
the Ninth Circuit.14 The difficulties encountered when the movant
must show involuntariness under an incomplete or ambiguous record
cannot be overemphasized. As a result of these difficulties, the re-
viewing courts' decisions are often interspersed with admonitions to
the district court judges to the effect that they should comply with
Rule 11 in the interest of clarity.15 These admonitions alone point to
some basic dissatisfaction with the traditional view.16
States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954). But note that the Davis case
was very scanty authority at best. The only reference to burden of proof in
the Davis case is the following statement: "Of course, a failure to make the
determination required [by Rule 11] would of itself be reversible error only
in the absence of a showing that in fact the defendant understood the nature
of the charges to which his plea was entered." Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
It would seem, then, that the view in the Seventh Circuit is as yet unsettled.
Note that the Ninth Circuit had placed the burden of proof on the issue of
voluntariness on the government upon a showing of noncompliance with
Rule 11 even before the Heiden decision. Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d
356, 360 (9th Cir. 1962). Of course, the Ninth Circuit view here is moot,
since Heiden dispensed with the hearing altogether. In a very real sense
the government has been given a most difficult burden of proof. It must
show the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, at the trial of his case.
14 Four circuits have been urged to adopt the Heiden Rule and have
refused. See Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1968); Halliday v.
United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967); Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d
23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881 (1967); Brokaw v. United States, 368
F.2d 508 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967); cf. Bailey v. MacDougall,
392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court did vacate the sentence without a
hearing, after reciting the normal procedure elucidated in the Brolcaw case,
on the basis that the record was conclusive in favor of the movant. Three
other circuits have decided cases since Heiden and have followed the tradi-
tional view, Heiden apparently not being urged. See Manley v. United States,
396 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Del Piano, 386 F.2d 436 (3d Cir.
1967); Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967); Day v. United
States, 357 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1966). Two circuits have apparently not
touched on the issue since Heiden and still adhere to the traditional view.
See United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957); cf. Bone v. United
States, 351 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1965) (Bone was decided one month prior to
Heiden).
'5 E.g., Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d 23, 24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 881 (1967) ("a sentencing judge should comply . . . with . . . Rule
11"); Brokaw v. United States, 368 F.2d 508, 510 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 996 (1967) ("[We] underscore our direction to district court judges that
voluntariness, as well as understanding, be fully explored before a plea is
accepted").
16 Cases cited note 15 supra.
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The significance of Heiden
The dissatisfaction with the traditional view ripened into decision
on November 2, 1965, in the Ninth Circuit in Heiden v. United States.17
In Heiden, the court overruled Long v. United States,8 which had
utilized the traditional view, and Munich v. United States,19 which
had shifted the burden of proof on the issue of voluntariness to the
Government. The Heiden court based its decision wholly upon its
construction of Rule 11: "Rule 11 is mandatory .... [T] he fact
that a plea was intelligently entered . . . must be ascertained at the
time of the arraignment . . . and not after the fact. .... ",20 Heiden
alleged that the sentence imposed was greater than that which he
had been informed was possible. Applying the traditional view, the
district court granted him a hearing. At the hearing the court found
that the accused had, in fact, voluntarily pleaded guilty and that he
had had a full knowledge of the entire range of penalities and a
complete understanding of the nature of the charge. The district
court, therefore, refused to vacate the sentence.21
Even though this finding of fact was sustained by the Ninth
Circuit, it reversed the judgment and vacated the sentence.22  The
court reasoned that prejudice is established when it is alleged that a
specific and material lack of understanding existed which, if true,
would render the plea invalid and which could have been discovered
through proper inquiry at the arraignment. 23  "[Rule 11] thus con-
templates that disputes as to the understanding of the defendant and
the voluntariness of his actions are to be eliminated at the outset,24
and that courts are thereby to be freed from the troublesome task of
searching at a later date for the truth as to a defendant's then state
of mind.' 2 5 The Heiden Rule was thus promulgated. As a result,
17 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
18 290 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1961).
19 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1962) (overruled sub silentio).
20 353 F.2d at 55.
21 The traditional view grants the hearing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1964), and hears the evidence on voluntariness. Heiden established that
Rule 11 had not been complied with at his arraignment. The Government
then sustained its burden of proof to the satisfaction of the district court.
Heiden's sentence was ordered to continue.
22 353 F.2d at 55.
23 Id.
24 The Court here analogizes to the old leading case of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1937), which contained dicta to the effect that the
defendant's voluntary waiver of counsel should appear of record. If the case
seems "out-of-date," it is suggested that the basic principles elucidated therein
have recently been reiterated in modern cases. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
25 353 F.2d at 55.
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Heiden's sentence was vacated and he was given an opportunity to
replead the indictment.
Obviously, a man in Heiden's position would plead not guilty. The
Government, hence, is given a choice: It may either try the sub-
stantive crime or set the man free. The trial may come many months
or years after the original arraignment. Witnesses and crucial evi-
dence may no longer be available. If the case goes to trial, the Gov-
ernment must show guilt of the substantive offense beyond a reason-
able doubt. Clearly, trying the substantive offense is a greater "bur-
den" than merely attempting to show a voluntary plea at the evi-
dentiary hearing which the traditional view would grant. Hence, as
a practical matter, the step beyond existing law taken by the Ninth
Circuit in Heiden is quite a substantial one.
Recent Modifications to the Heiden Rule
During the term of the court under review, the Ninth Circuit de-
cided six cases further defining and clarifying the Heiden Rule. In
Jones v. United States,28 the presiding officer at the arraignment had
complied fully with Rule 11. After sentencing and imprisonment,
Jones alleged in a Section 2255 27 motion that his plea had been in-
duced by "coercive in-custody interrogation without counsel," by
"threats" to Jones and his family, and by "promises of leniency."28
These allegations, it was conceded, were outside the scope of the rec-
ord. The district court reasoned that the logical converse of Heiden
was that compliance with Rule 11 necessarily precluded any subse-
quent inquiry into the validity of the plea. The Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that compliance with Rule 11 did not preclude an
evidentiary hearing on issues wholly without the scope of the rec-
ord.29 The court, however, did not vacate the sentence as it had done
in Heiden. It would seem that Jones emphasizes the principle that
the Heiden Rule was not intended to restrict the rights of the accused
in any sense. While Heiden sets up a procedure which alleviates
irregularities at the arraignment, other irregularities outside the rec-
ord do not escape judicial scrutiny merely because the arraignment
was proper.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Heiden in the cases of McClure v.
United States8" and Combs v. United States.1 In the former, while it
was true that the arraigning judge had failed to warn the accused of
26 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
28 384 F.2d at 917.
29 Id.
s0 389 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1968).
81 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the possibility that he might be sentenced as a youthful offender, the
court corrected its error and offered the accused the opportunity to
withdraw his plea of guilty. The offer being refused, the court
accepted the plea. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of relief under Section 225582 on the theory that Rule 11 had
been satisfied before the accused was committed to his plea.33 In the
latter case, the allegations in the Section 225534 motion were held
insufficient to raise a disputable issue since the record was con-
clusive.35 Therefore, the Heiden Rule could not apply.
Castro v. United States30 placed the first significant restriction on
the application of the Heiden Rule: It was not to apply retroactively.
Castro's allegations were sufficient to bring him squarely within the
accepted doctrine of Heiden. The district court dismissed the motion
to vacate (erroneously) without a hearing even though the record
was inconclusive. The circuit court reversed, granted a hearing and
followed the traditional view, but refused to vacate the sentence as
dictated by the Heiden Rule. 7 Its application would be prospective
only,3 8 dating from the decision of Heiden, November 2, 1965.
The cases of Gomez v. United States3 9 and Zamora v. United
States4 0 involved slight factual variations from Castro, each of which
raised the same issue. In both decisions, the court refused to apply
the Heiden Rule retroactively. It seems, therefore, to be settled within
the Ninth Circuit that the Heiden Rule will have only a prospective
application.
The present status of Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit, as a result of
these decisions, can be stated succinctly as follows: (1) the arraigning
judge is obliged to make the record clear that the accused has been
apprised of the charge against him, the facts necessary to constitute
the charged offense, and the consequences flowing from a plea of
guilty to that charge; (2) the record must clearly reflect that the plea
has not been induced through the application of methods contrary to
the policy of the law and the regulations of the circuit; (3) if either of
the two above requisites are not met, there accrues to the accused
the right to have his sentence automatically set aside (upon a propei
32 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
38 McClure v. United States, 389 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1968).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
35 Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
36 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968).
87 Id.
38 Id. at 348. The court notes Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966),
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), on the refusal to apply a particular
rule of criminal procedure retroactively.
39 396 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1968).
40 397 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1968).
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motion) and the right to replead the indictment; and (4) the rights
under the Heiden Rule do not accrue to an accused whose arraignment
occurred prior to November 2, 1965.
41
Analysis of the Procedures
There are two distinct views as to the treatment of the allegations
of a prisoner in a proper motion that Rule 11 was incorrectly applied
at his arraignment and that his plea was involuntary. The traditional
view, which applies in all circuits other than the Ninth Circuit, de-
mands only that an evidentiary hearing be granted on the issue of
whether the plea was voluntary. The Ninth Circuit view, on the other
hand, grants a summary vacation of sentence.
The question naturally arises, in the light of recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning criminal procedure, whether the elements
of due process are satisfied by either or both of the procedures out-
lined above. At the least, it seems clear that the Heiden Rule satisfies
due process, for under this procedure the prisoner gets the benefit of
any doubt. The Ninth Circuit in Heiden precluded a constitutional
discussion by basing its decision wholly upon its construction of Rule
11, a rule of procedure, not of substance.42  The Supreme Court has
not passed on the precise issue. The leading case of Machibroda v.
United States4s is authority for the position that at least a hearing is
required.44 At the time of Machibroda, Heiden had not been decided
and the question of an immediate vacation of sentence did not arise.
The Supreme Court has declined to hear two cases in which this issue
was squarely presented. 45 Hence, there is no direct authority on the
constitutional issue.
The closest analogy to the constitutional considerations of the
Heiden Rule, it would seem, is found in the voluntary confession
cases. In Jackson v. Denno,46 the Supreme Court held that, not-
withstanding the irregularity of the New York procedure, the defend-
ant was not entitled to a new trial if, in fact, his confession was found
to be voluntary at a subsequent evidentiary hearing.47 However, it
41 No provision is included for the situation presented in Jones v.
United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967). It is submitted that Jones plays
no part in the present status of the Heiden Rule. Rather it is an independent
basis for relief designed to cover situations for which Heiden is insufficient.
42 353 F.2d at 55.
43 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
44 Id. at 496; see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
45 Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d 23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 881 (1967); Brokaw v. United States, 368 F.2d 508 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967).
46 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
47 Id.
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is to be noted that the decision was decided by a bare majority and
that Justice Clark, in his dissent, specified that even were he to agree
with the majority that the New York procedure was unconstitutional,
he would nevertheless vacate the sentence rather than send it back
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the confession was
voluntary.48 The analogy is not perfect since the concepts are not
identical. If it is conceded, however, that both the guilty plea and
the confession are protected by fundamental due process, then, in the
light of the similarities between the two,49 the analogy would seem
to be quite persuasive. Consequently, if the analogy is sound, it
seems clear that both the traditional view and the Heiden Rule are
equally constitutional.
Assuming, then, that the constitutional issue is resolved, the ques-
tion of policy becomes relevant. The policy of the Ninth Circuit view
seems to be to eliminate questions of prejudice by eliminating hear-
ings resulting from alleged violations of Rule 11 altogether. Although
the Court's decision in Jones v. United States5° precludes the absolute
disposal of the case upon compliance with Rule 11, the bulk of the
cases in the future will be wholly disposed of by a proper inquiry at
the arraignment. Of course, situations can be imagined in which
disposing of the case in this manner would create problems. The
obvious hypothetical situation which comes to mind is the accused
who is not a "hardened criminal" and who is somewhat overawed by
the whole arraignment. To this accused, the judge appears as a great
symbol of power in whose hands rests the future of the accused him-
self. In such a situation, some writers have doubted the validity of
the formalities of Rule 11 as a method of discovering the accused's
state of mind.51 But on the other hand, it would seem that in the
bulk of the cases in which a guilty plea is taken, such a plea will, in
fact, be voluntary.52
While refusing to adopt the Heiden Rule, the other ten circuits
also have the goal of administering justice in a fair and impartial
manner to each accused. The advantage of the traditional view of
granting merely a hearing is that the justly convicted man is not set
48 Id. at 426.
49 In this regard, it should be noted that Congress, in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 35Ol(e)
(June 19, 1968), defines "confessions" as follows: "any confession of guilt of
any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given
orally or in writing." (Emphasis added.) While this act may be under fire
for other reasons, it would seem that the treatment of a plea of guilty as a
confession of guilt is sound.
50 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967).
51 See, e.g., 8 R. CiPEs, MooR's FEDERAL PRAczrEc--CiPEs, Cpnmv=A RULEs
11.03 (2d ed. 1965).
52 Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967) is the obvious
exception.
[Vol. 20
CRIEMNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
free due to some technicality in the record. Does this advantage,
however, justify perpetuating a system in which district court judges
are allowed to ignore the spirit of a rule of procedure? Rule 11 is
conceded to be a good rule of procedure in all circuits.53  Lack of
compliance with the rule at the arraignment may well cause difficulty
of inquiry at any subsequent proceeding. The court must make a
determination months and sometimes years after the time of the
arraignment. Clearly it may be difficult to make the proper finding.
The shifting of the burden of proof to the Government after non-
compliance with Rule 11 has been shown, as is done in the First and
possibly the Seventh Circuits, 4 seems to be a movement in the right
direction. However, it would seem that even such a procedure falls
short of disposing of possible prejudice.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the procedure used in the Ninth Circuit comes
closer to the common goal of serving the ends of justice in all cases.
The traditional view, though not without merit, seems to give the dis-
trict court judge a "second chance" at finding that a particular plea
was voluntary. The modified traditional view, shifting the burden of
proof on the issue of voluntariness to the Government, does not seem
to be adequate. The argument of the Ninth Circuit-that prejudice
inures of necessity to the prisoner who must face an inconclusive
record at a subsequent hearing-seems difficult to answer.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Heiden and the modifications which have followed fit rather firmly
into the tenor of the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of
criminal procedure within the last few years. The decisions evidence
the modern trend toward the greater protection of the accused. And
while it would be a non sequitur to argue in absolute terms that there
is a constitutional issue involved in the Heiden situation,55 it seems
desirable, nevertheless, to eliminate whatever prejudice might be con-
ceded in such a situation. Prejudice is established, the Heiden court
argued, when the allegations of an involuntary plea are specific and
material, the record is incomplete, and the problems could have been
alleviated by a proper inquiry by the judge at the arraignment.56 It
would seem that only after such prejudices are eliminated can a sound
judicial system be assured.
D.W.L.
53 Cases cited note 15 supra.
54 Cases cited note 13 supra.
55 That is, as stated, the Heiden court based its decision on a construc-
tion of Rule 11 and thus avoided any constitutional overtones. Hence, to argue
from Heiden to a constitutional issue would be a non sequitur.
56 353 F.2d at 55.
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B. Right to Counsel
1. In-Custody Interrogation-Couglan v. United
States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
The Ninth Circuit in Coughlan v. United States1 was faced with
the general problem of whether a confession was properly admitted
into evidence under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. As in all
such cases, the courts "are forced to resolve a conflict between two
fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient
law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of its
individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods
of law enforcement." 2 This statement by Chief Justice Warren was
made nearly a decade ago, prior to the landmark decisions on the right
to counsel and the right against self-incrimination. 3 But a balance
has not yet been struck between those conflicting interests. While
Miranda v. Arizona4 laid down in a very detailed manner the rules for
securing an admissible confession,5 it left unanswered many questions
concerning the conduct of in-custody interrogation. 6
In Coughlan the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction that de-
pended upon an in-custody oral confession. Coughlan had been con-
victed of aiding and abetting the robbery of a federally insured bank.
At the time of his arrest the defendant was an indigent 19-year-old.
Following his arrest he was interviewed by an agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, who advised him of his Miranda rights.8
Coughlan stated that he desired to make no statement and the inter-
view was terminated. The following day he was arraigned before a
United States Commissioner and provided with counsel. Three days
after the arraignment the federal agent, accompanied by another
agent and an officer of the Los Angeles Police Department, went to
1 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
2 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
6 "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
7 391 F.2d 371 (1968).
8 Note 5 supra.
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interview the defendant.9 The interview was commenced by giving
Coughlan a full statement of his rights and having him read a written
statement of those rights. Coughlan indicated a willingness to talk to
the officers, but refused to sign the statement indicating a waiver of
his rights.' 0 When asked if he had appointed counsel, Coughlan an-
swered in the affirmative, but the interviewers proceeded with the
interrogation without notifying Coughlan's counsel or arranging for
his presence at the interrogation. During this interview Coughlan
made the incriminating statement which was used against him at the
trial.
The majority of the Ninth Circuit panel, in a per curiam opinion,
held that there was a proper waiver of counsel. The court refused to
hold that the defendant's statement was inadmissible on the ground
that his attorney had not been timely advised of the interview. The
court, however, did indicate the desirability of affording defendant's
counsel the opportunity to be present at any custodial interrogation.
Judge Hamley, in a vigorous dissent, attacked the holding on two
grounds: First, that Coughlan's waiver was not made knowingly
and intelligently;" second, that the conduct of the interrogators vio-
lated Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.'2  Relying pri-
marily on Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois, 3 Judge Hamley built an
impressive argument for the proposition that the conduct of the inter-
rogating officers flouted "the spirit of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments and the rationale of Miranda."'4
The impact of this decision upon future Ninth Circuit cases in-
volving in-custody confessions can best be evaluated by analyzing
the two grounds on which Judge Hamley based his dissent. Miranda
emphasized the desirability of having counsel present during custodial
interrogation. It is not an absolute requirement,' 5 but dispels "the
compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation ....
9 There was evidence that this interview was conducted at the instiga-
tion of the defendant's father.
10 It is not necessary that the defendant sign such a waiver. "There
is no requirement as to the precise manner in which police communicate the
required warnings to one suspected of crime. The requirement is that the
police fully advise such a person of his rights .... " Bell v. United States,
382 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 965 (1968).
11 391 F.2d 374-75 (dissenting opinion).
12 Id. at 376.
13 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14 391 F.2d at 374 (dissenting opinion).
15 The Court noted that there could be a valid waiver of the right
to counsel but set stringent standards by which the validity of the waiver
is to be judged. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).
16 Id. at 465; United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1968);
see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1966).
March 1969]
Hamley seems to have gone further. He viewed the failure of the ques-
tioners to notify Coughlan's counsel of the planned interrogation as
such a deprivation of counsel that the resulting incriminating state-
ment could not properly be said to have resulted from a valid waiver.17
He pointed to the fact that at the first interview, immediately follow-
ing his arrest, the defendant refused to make a statement and also
that at the time of the second interview he had court-appointed coun-
sel. In his opinion these facts differentiated the case from others:
"Where one accused of a federal offense has not already stated that
he did not desire to talk, a request that he do so, made in full con-
formity with [Miranda] . . . and prior to the retention or appoint-
ment of counsel is unobjectionable."' 8 It would seem, however, that
the defendant who does not have counsel, either retained or court
appointed, is more in need of protection than one who has counsel,
for one of the important safeguards to ensure the voluntariness of a
confession is the necessity of shielding the defendant from the coer-
cive effects of uncounselled in-custody interrogation. 9 One who
has at least had some opportunity to consult with counsel would be
in a much better position to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelli-
gent waiver of counsel20 than one who has not been afforded this
opportunity.
If Judge Hamley's position were to prevail, could the court hold a
waiver such as Coughlan's to be invalid, while holding a waiver by
one who never had the assistance of counsel to be valid? This is not
to say that Coughlan's waiver should have been recognized, but it is
suggested that if Coughlan's waiver was invalid there is a strong
presumption that a waiver made by one who never had counsel is
also invalid.21
An in depth consideration of what is essential to constitute an
intelligent waiver is not within the purview of this note.22  It is
17 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissent-
ing opinion).
18 Id.; see ALI, A MODEL CODE Or PRE-ARRAIGNMNT PROCEDURE § A5.08
(2) (e) & Note (Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
19 See cases cited note 16 supra.
20 Even with the detailed warnings required by Miranda, it is not as-
sured that a defendant will understand the nature and scope of his rights.
The standard warnings are not so clear and unambiguous that the possibility
of misunderstanding is precluded. See Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement
Miranda, 66 Mftcn. L. REv. 1347, 1372-75 (1968).
21 The defendant's waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). One who has no opportunity to
consult with an attorney is less likely to comprehend the protection afforded
by his fifth and sixth amendment rights.
22 See Note, Waiver of Counsel infra at 965.
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important, however, to recognize the trend to burden the government
with the responsibility of demonstrating the validity of the waiver.
23
The defendant is not required to have the knowledge of a lawyer 24
to waive his right to counsel, but he must have more than the mere
mental competence to stand trial.25 In view of the language of recent
decisions,2 6 it can be argued that allowing the defendant to waive
his right to counsel without the advice of an attorney is tantamount
to permitting him to incriminate himself because of an ignorance of his
legal and constitutional rights.27
Judge Hamley's first basis for dissent implies a broader policy,
consideration than the narrow issue of the validity of a waiver. It
suggests further safeguards for the defendant during custodial inter-
rogations. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Spano v. New York,28
explained the need for effective safeguards at the in-custody stage
of the proceedings: "[W]hat use is a defendant's right to effective
counsel at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting
trial, he can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he confesses?
In that event the secret trial in the police precincts effectively sup-
plants the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. ' 29
Judge Hamley urged reversal on a second ground. He contended
that the second interview of Coughlan violated Canon 9 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics.30 This canon, in substance, prohibits counsel
from communicating with a party represented by counsel, if the com-
munication concerns the subject of controversy. It also places "a
responsibility upon prosecuting lawyers not to sanction, or take ad-
vantage of, statements obtained by Government agents from a person
represented by counsel, in the absence of such counsel. " 31 From a
reading of the cases, it appears that the courts are not in harmony
as to what constitutes a Canon 9 violation or as to the consequences of
finding such a violation. 32 This can be explained by the relatively
23 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); see Griffith v. Rhay,
282 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961).
24 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
25 Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517 at 6 (9th Cir., March 5, 1968).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
27 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
28 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
29 Id. at 326 (concurring opinion); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932).
30 ABA CANoxs OF PROFESSiONAL ETHics No. 9.
31 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion); accord, Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963) (dic-
turn); United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum), rev'd
on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
82 Compare Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963), with
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recent use of this argument in urging reversal in criminal cases. 33
The dissent states that "Canon 9 is as applicable in criminal pro-
ceedings as in civil proceedings. '8 4 The case law on this point is not
extensive and there is some authority to the effect that custodial
interrogation is an exception to the canon, and that even if the canon
applies to prosecuting attorneys it should not be applied to law en
forcement officers. 35 These authorities support their position by point-
ing to the fact that in some jurisdictions it is accepted practice for the
prosecution or its representatives to interview the defendant after
indictment and appointment of counsel. They then conclude that if
it is a common practice it is not a breach of Canon 9 and is not un-
ethical.
Notwithstanding this argument, most federal courts that have
considered the problem have held that the canon is applicable to crim-
inal proceedings. 36 These courts have held that a prosecuting attor-
ney should not interview a represented defendant in the absence of
his counsel. From this point Judge Hamley reasons to the position
that prosecuting attorneys should not avail themselves of the product
of an interview conducted by law enforcement officers in the absence
of the defendant's counsel. 37 This is a logical conclusion since the
prosecution should not by indirection be permitted to obtain state-
ments that it could not obtain directly.
As interpreted by the ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Canon 9 prohibits opposing counsel from interviewing
a represented defendant, in the absence of his counsel, even if he is
willing to discuss the matter.38 If this is the case, and if criminal
defendants are to be afforded the protection of counsel at every stage
of the proceeding, is it ethical to allow the prosecution "to take ad-
vantage of an indigent prisoner without counsel . ... "?3 By the
United States v. Ferguson, 243 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1965) and United
States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967).
See also Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952).
33 Canon 9 violations have been urged as a basis for reversal in some
recent cases. See, e.g., cases cited note 31 supra. However, no reported
criminal case prior to 1963 has been found that discusses Canon 9 and its
applicability to criminal prosecutions.
34 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion) citing H. DRINKER, LEr.AL ETmcs 202 (1953), and Broeder, Wong Sun
v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 601 (1963).
85 United States v. Ferguson, 243 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1965).
86 E.g., Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964, 970 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
87 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion).
38 ABA CoMn. ON PROFESSIONAL E mcs, OPNONS, No. 108 (1934) (inter-
preting the application of the Canon to a civil proceeding).
89 Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963).
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terms of this canon if a represented defendant desired to waive his
right to counsel, his counsel would have to be notified and given an
opportunity to consult with him.40 Prior to consultation with his
attorney it would be unethical for the prosecutor or his staff to inter-
view the accused.41 Thus the nonconstitutional ground carries Judge
Hamley to a bolder position than he was willing to endorse on the
constitutional, sixth amendment ground. For, if opposing counsel
cannot interview a willing defendant in the absence of his counsel,
and if a defendant without counsel should be afforded the same pro-
tection as a counseled defendant, it must be concluded that any in-
custody interrogation must be conducted in the presence of the de-
fendant's attorney.42
In view of the above it is surprising that the courts have not
reversed criminal convictions when they have found a Canon 9 vio-
lation. Although there has been general disapproval of such prac-
tices,43 there has been no judicial disposition to upset convictions
secured in violation of the canon. Even the two decisions relied upon
by Judge Hamley in establishing the relevance of the Canon 9 vio-
lation were not reversed solely because of a violation of the Code of
Ethics. 44 Both cases grounded their holdings on violation of Rule 5
(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that
an arrested person be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay.45
The Coughlian case illustrates the general approach that the courts
have taken to Canon 9 violations. The majority states: "We . . . do
not want to be considered as lending our approval to the practice, if
indeed a practice exists, of interviewing accused persons in jail in the
absence of counsel. " 46 The court was reluctant to reverse on such a
40 ABA CoMM~lvi. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs, OPINIONs, No. 108 (1934).
41 Id.; see Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum). But see
United States v. Ferguson, 243 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1965).
42 This, of course, assumes that there has not been a valid waiver. But,
as suggested above, a strict enforcement of Canon 9 would require that the
defendant receive the advice of counsel before his waiver could be accepted
as constitutionally valid.
43 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Mathies v.
United States, 374 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
44 Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Lee v. United
States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963).
45 "Under the leadership of this Court a rule has been adopted for fed-
eral courts, that denies admission to confessions obtained before prompt ar-
raignment notwithstanding their voluntary character. [Citations omitted.]
This experiment has been made in an attempt to abolish the opportunities for
coercion which prolonged detention without a hearing is said to enhance."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953).
40 391 F.2d at 372; accord, Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 316
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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ground, but this practice which the majority will not sanction will con-
tinue to be employed unless some action is taken. The dissent indi-
cates that confessions or admissions that are the product of Canon 9
violations should not be admitted into evidence.47
Since this area of the law is in a state of flux, policy consider-
ations will have some influence in determining how far the court-
will go in excluding in-custody confessions.48 While some author-
ities place great stress on the importance of confessions to effective
police enforcement,49 this argument is counterbalanced by the Su-
preme Court's stated preference for the traditional, in-court, adver-
sary system of justice as opposed to trial by interrogation. 0 The
majority in Coughlan refused to place further restrictions on the
conduct of custodial interrogation, but did recognize the trend toward
affording criminal defendants maximum assistance of counsel from
the time that rights attaches. 1
It is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit will adopt the reasoning
of the dissent in the near future. While the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court lend support to arguments that counsel should be
present during in-custody interrogation, they do not compel such a
procedure. And it would appear from the rather terse majority
opinion that the judges were in no mood for judicial trail blazing,
47 Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion). See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967), where the court,
in discussing an illegal lineup, stated: "[T]he state is therefore not entitled
to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source.
Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective
sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup."
48 Congress has already made its influence felt in this area. The Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. § 3501) overturns Escobedo and
Miranda to the extent that the absence of the warnings, required by these
cases, does not render a confession per se inadmissible. The statute rein-
states the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test for determining the voluntari-
ness of confessions.
The constitutionality of this law has yet to be challenged. But the strong
language of Miranda makes it doubtful whether it will be able to withstand
such a challenge.
49 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539-45 (1966) (White, J.)(dissenting opinion). See also Kuh, The "Rest of Us" in the "Policing the
Police" Controversy, 57 J. Calm. L.C. & P.S. 244 (1966).
50 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 237-38 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 481 (1966).
51 The right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation in order
"to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation
is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under
the system we delineate today." Id. at 469.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
March 19691 CRIMINAL LAW AIY~D PROCEDURE
and thus that the next step in defining the sixth amendment right to
counsel will have to come from the Supreme Court or Congress.
P.W.B.
2. Waiver of Counsel-Hodge v. United States,
No. 20,517 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
In Hodge v. United States1 the Ninth Circuit was presented the
question whether, at his trial for a violation of section 2312 of Title 18
of the United States Code,2 the petitioner had made a valid waiver of
counsel.
At the commencement of the trial, Hodge's appointed counsel
stated that because of a "difference of opinion" between himself and
Hodge, Hodge had decided to represent himself.3 The court relieved
counsel of responsibility other than being in attendance to aid in pro-
cedural matters, but only after admonishing Hodge that he would be
at a "distinct disadvantage" in representing himself.
4
Having been found guilty by a jury, Hodge petitioned the Ninth
Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he had not made
an intelligent waiver of counsel. The Ninth Circuit, reciting the
requisites for such a waiver, held that the petitioner's waiver was not
valid, despite the effort of the trial court to ensure that the petitioner's
right to counsel was not violated.5
In its statement of the requisites for a valid waiver, the court
pronounced what appear to be new and more stringent requirements
with which the trial court must comply.6 The court's argument was
based on two principal grounds. First, the court relied heavily on
the language of Justice Black in Von Moltke v. Gillies.7 Second, the
court drew an analogy to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
1 No. 20,517 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
2 Transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in foreign commerce. 18
U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
3 Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 2 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
4 Id. at 2 n.2. When the trial reconvened one week later, the original
appointed attorney being unable to attend, a substitute attorney was present
at the request of the head of the Indigent Panel. However, the second
attorney did not appear after the noon recess, so the court appointed, for the
same limited purpose, a third attorney. The original attorney arrived part
way through the trial and resumed his advisory capacity. It does not appear
that any of the attorneys performed "any significant service." Id. at 3-4.
5 Id. at 6-9.
6 Id. at 6.
7 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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Procedure which prescribes the requirements for a valid plea of guilty
and the duty of the judge in accepting such a plea.8 The language of
Rule 11 emphasizes the necessity for the accused to understand the
consequences of his plea before the court accepts the plea.9 The
court also indicated, by way of dictum, that, under certain circum-
stances, it might be necessary for the accused to have counsel
appointed in order to ensure the validity of a subsequent waiver of
counsel. 10
In order to appreciate the departure the Ninth Circuit has made
from standard federal procedure, it will be necessary to inspect the
historical background of waiver of counsel, including the Von Moltke
decision.
Historical Development of Waiver of Counsel in Federal Courts
In the leading case of Johnson v. Zerbst," in which the right to
counsel in federal criminal proceedings was initially recognized, the
Supreme Court stated that a waiver of counsel to be valid must be
"intelligent and competent," and placed the burden on the trial judge
to determine if there had been a proper waiver of the right to coun-
sel. 2 Johnson was subsequently held applicable to cases in which
the accused desired to plead guilty'3 in addition to waiving counsel.
Following the Supreme Court's enunciation in Johnson of the
s "The effectiveness or validity of any claimed waiver must. . depend
upon the record's revelation that the accused, within the limits of his intelli-
gence, was previously and reasonably advised of the possible consequences of
the surrender." Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 6 (9th Cir., Mar. 5,
1968). "[B]efore the trial judge accepts a waiver of counsel and proceeds
with the accused representing himself, he must take steps similar to those
which he would take before accepting a plea of guilty." Id. at 7.
9 "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent
of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without
first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea." FED. R. Calm. P. 11.
10 "Moreover, insofar as it may be practicable to do so, by the ap-
pointment of counsel for a limited purpose or otherwise, the court must
satisfy itself that the accused, in order to appreciate the risk, possess reason-
able understanding of the bare elements of the offense and choices of pleas
and defenses which might be available." Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517,
at 8 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968) (emphasis added).
11 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
12 Id. at 465.
13 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). A waiver of counsel in
conjunction with a plea of guilty becomes important in the subsequent dis-
cussion of Von Moltkce by the court in Hodge. See text accompanying notes
39-43 infra.
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"intelligent and competent" rule, there followed many attacks upon
convictions obtained prior to Johnson. These attacks were based upon
a recognition that in order to make an "intelligent and competent"
waiver of the right to counsel, the accused must of necessity know
he possessed the right to counsel. The courts of appeals, in many
cases, implemented this reasoning by recognizing, as a precondition to
a finding of valid waiver, a duty on the part of the trial court to
inform the accused of his right to counsel and to have counsel
appointed if he could not obtain it. This duty was deemed satisfied
in some cases by the submission of an affidavit by the trial court
reciting its custom of advising all defendants appearing before it of
their right to counsel,14 or more specifically reciting that the defend-
ant in the particular case under consideration had been advised of
his right to counsel.15 In other cases it was held unnecessary to in-
form the defendant of his right to counsel specifically if it was shown
that he already knew he possessed such a right;, 6 it was also held
that a waiver of the right to counsel could be implied from a defend-
ant's appearance without counsel and his failure then to request
such assistance;1'7 in still other cases it was held that the defendant
was presumed to know the law so that a waiver of counsel could be
found from a defendant's failure to overcome this presumption in
habeas corpus proceedings.1 8  The overall implication of these cases
negated the existence of any specific duty on the part of the trial judge
to advise the accused of his right to counsel in order to find a valid
waiver, notwithstanding the statement to the contrary in Johnson.0
At the very least, the cases indicated an extremely loose application of
the principles of Johnson.20
14 Lewis v Johnston, 112 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1940); Moore v. Hudspeth,
110 F.2d 386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 643 (1940); Towne v. Hudspeth,
108 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1939).
15 E.g., De Jordan v. Hunter, 145 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 853 (1945); Widmer v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 780 (1943); Blood v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1940). See
generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949).
16 E.g., Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1944); O'Keith v.
Johnston, 146 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945), where
it was stated: "If the court feels that he understands that he is waiving a
right, it is not [jurisdictionally] imperative that he be... reminded of it....
To inform him of the existence of a right which he knew and had intelligently
waived would have been a useless act." Id. at 232.
17 E.g., Cundiff v. Nicholson, 107 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1939); McCoy v.
Hudspeth, 106 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1939); Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939).
18 E.g., Jorgensen v. Swope, 114 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1940); Harpin v.
Johnston, 109 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 624 (1940).
'9 See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003, 1022 (1949).
20 See Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Par-
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In the attacks upon convictions obtained between the date of the
Johnson decision and March 21, 1946, the effective date of Rule 44 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, most decisions involving
waiver of counsel looked to the particular facts of the case to deter-
mine whether there had been a "knowing and intelligent" waiver.
The cases of this period did not require absolutely that the trial court
advise the defendant of his right to counsel2 ' as a precondition to
finding a valid waiver. Rule 44 required specifically that the trial
court advise a defendant of his right to counsel and assign counsel
to the defendant if necessary.2 2 Congress purportedly had intended
Rule 44 to be merely a codification of these decisions.2 3 As can be
seen from the brief review of Johnson and cases subsequent to it,
however, what actually was established by the federal decisions
prior to the enactment of Rule 44 is open to some question.
Von Moltke v. Gillies
In 1948 the Supreme Court pronounced even more stringent
guidelines for ascertaining the validity of a waiver of counsel than it
had established in Johnson. In Von Moltke v. Gillies,24 the court
held:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the
nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to
ticipation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALI. L. REV. 1262,
1263 (1966).
21 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Sanford, 52 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ga. 1943); Ex
parte D'Elia, 51 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Ky. 1943).
22 "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at
every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is
able to obtain counsel." FED. R. CmM. P. 44, 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 44 (1964). As
amended July 1, 1966, Rule 44 reads: "Every defendant who is unable to
obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel represent him at every stage
of the proceeding from his initial appearance before the commissioner ... un-
less he waives such appointment." FED. R. CaUm. P. 44.
23 Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 821 (1947).
24 332 U.S. 708 (1948). On the facts, the alleged waiver would appear
not to have met the standards of Johnson and thus could have been disposed
of on the basis of the Johnson formula. The defendant, a German indicted for
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, was held for over a month, during
which time federal agents were with her daily, some of whom answered
questions erroneously as to the charges against her and as to what she should
do when she came to trial. She repeatedly asked for counsel but never ob-
tained it. Finally she signed a waiver of counsel and pleaded guilty. Id. at
714-15; see Burch v. United States, 359 F.2d 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1966), describing
the circumstances in Von Moltke as "aggravated" and thus inferring that the
rule in Johnson would have sufficed to determine the invalidity of the waiver.
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the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.25
The court indicated the standards it would require of the trial judge
as to his determination that such a proper waiver had been made by
stating:
[A] mere routine inquiry-the asking of several standard questions
followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel-may
leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed
decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to
counsel.26
Von Moltke has been interpreted differently by different courts.2 7
Some courts have diminished its importance while others have cited
it as a correct formulation of the requirements for the determination
of a valid waiver of counsel. The Eighth Circuit in Collins v. United
States23 stated that Von Moltke was not "required to be read ... as
an absolute rule of law that no waiver of counsel can or will be per-
mitted ... unless the trial court has expressly made [a] state-
ment in the courtroom to a prisoner of his right to such assistance
.... ,"29 The court stated that the rule of Johnson was to be followed,
and inferred that Von Moltke was merely a reiteration of the princi-
ples of Johnson.30  One recent district court decision dismissed the
statements in Von Moltke regarding waiver of counsel as dicta. 31
Several decisions, some of them quite recent, have cited Von
Moltke with approval, adopting the express language of the case or
language similar to it. 3 2 One such decision stated that the language
25 322 U.S. at 724.
26 Id.
27 Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517 at 7 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
28 206 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1953).
29 Id. at 922.
80 "Always the question seems to have been regarded as . . . one of ap-
praising, on all the probative elements ... of each particular situation,
whether as a matter of knowledge and intent on the part of the prisoner, there
existed in fact a competent and intelligent waiver by him of the assistance of
counsel in what he did .... " Id. See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155
(1957); Burch v. United States, 359 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1964).
31 Earley v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 522, 526 (C.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd,
381 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967).
32 Cranford v. Rodriguez, 373 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1967). The Ninth
Circuit stated that the district court in denying an application for habeas
corpus from a conviction in a California state court "did not inquire as to
whether [the defendant] was aware of the statutory offenses included within
the charge, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses
to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof." Sessions v. Wilson,
372 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1966). In a habeas corpus proceeding concerning a
conviction in a state court, the Tenth Circuit stated: "The trial judge before
whom an accused, charged with a felony, appears without counsel, must make
a thorough inquiry to determine whether there is an understanding and in-
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of Von MoZtke was "[t] he governing principle for determining what
constitutes a competent and valid waiver of the right to counsel and
responsibility of the trial judge in accepting such a waiver. .... ,,. 3
The strongest case in support of Von Moltke, adopting the same
interpretation given to it by the court in Hodge, is Day v. United
States,34 in which the defendant, stating that he did not want counsel,
pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit in Day made the same analogy
between Von Moltke and Rule 11 as the Ninth Circuit made in the
Hodge case.3 5 Ironically, Day seems to have been overlooked by the
Ninth Circuit, as the case was not cited in the Hodge decision.
Hodge v. United States
In expressing a new and more rigorous test to be applied in deter-
mining the competence of a waiver of counsel, the Ninth Circuit
adopted, at the least, the standards of Von Moltke. More probably,
it went beyond the requirements of that case. Even if the Ninth
Circuit intended simply to reiterate the requirements of Von MoZtke,
it still departed from the standard requirements for ascertaining the
validity of waiver of counsel. A reading of the cases indicates that
most courts ignored Von MoItke and continued to determine the
validity of an alleged waiver of counsel on the basis of the standards
instituted in Johnson, tempered by the cases which followed that
holding.3 6 As Rule 44 was intended by Congress to be merely a
codification of what had been established by the federal decisions up
to the time of its enactment,3 7 the use of the expanded rule of Von
Moltke as precedent is a departure from codified federal procedure
enunciated by Rule 44. Hodge, in its reliance by analogy to the
language of Rule li-which establishes the requisites for a valid
telligent waiver of counsel. He must investigate to the end that there can be
no question about the waiver, which should include an explanation of the
charge, the punishment provided by law, any possible defenses to the charge
or circumstances in mitigation thereof and explain all other facts . . . essen-
tial for the accused to have a complete understanding." Shawan v. -Cox,
350 F.2d 909, 912 (10th Cir. 1965); accord, United States v. Wantland, 199 F.2d
237, 238 (7th Cir. 1952).
33 United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1968);
see Meadows v. Maxwell, 371 F.2d 664, 668 (6th Cir. 1967).
34 357 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1966).
85 "In Von Moltke v. Gillies . . . the Supreme Court laid down certain
requirements (now embodied in part by Rule 11) that a district judge must
follow when a defendant endeavors to waive his right to counsel." Id. at 910;
accord, United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 285 (3d Cir. 1965), which
cites Von Moltke as to the defendant's understanding of the range of allowable
punishments and alludes to the requirements of Rule 11.
36 See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
37 Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 821 (1947). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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guilty plea rather than for a valid waiver of counsel-thereby making
it necessary for the accused to understand the consequences of a
waiver, is a step beyond even those cases that adopt Von MoItke and
differentiate Von Moltke from Johnson. Furthermore, Hodge is
practically unprecedented in its implication that the assistance of coun-
sel is a requisite to the effective waiver of one's right to counsel.
38
The Viability of the Use of Von Moltke As A Precedent and the
Use of Rule 11 as Analogous to Waiver of Counsel:
The interpretation of the Von Moltke holding by the majority in
Hodge was challenged by Judge Merrill in his dissenting opinion.8 9
Judge Merrill argued that the requirements expounded in Von
Moltke were to be applied only to a situation in which a plea of guilty
was made contemporaneously with a waiver of counsel.40 As the
Von Moltke decision does not differentiate between a waiver of coun-
sel and a waiver of counsel made contemporaneously with a plea of
guilty,41 however, the interpretation of the majority is to be pre-
ferred. Moreover, at a criminal trial the validity of a waiver of coun-
sel is a preliminary issue which must be determined at the time of
the alleged waiver on the basis of the evidence existing at that
time.42 Thus, whether the defendant pleads guilty or presents a valid
defense is of no significance to the decision as to the validity of a
waiver. Since the word "contemporaneous" signifies occurrences at
the same time,43 and, as issues concerning waiver of counsel must
necessarily be resolved before the plea of guilty is received, it would
appear that technically there never can be a waiver of counsel made
"contemporaneously" with a plea of guilty.
The court's reliance on Rule 11 as a basis for the requirements
of a waiver of counsel is as viable as its reliance on Von Moltke. It is
proper that the safeguards placed on "the crucial rights of one insist-
ing upon his innocence" be equal to "the rights of one who seeks to
confess a crime by a plea of guilty. '44 In fact, it would seem that
even greater safeguards should be placed on a waiver of counsel than
on a guilty plea since a guilty plea has the additional safeguard that
38 See Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 8 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
39 Id. at 12.
40 Id.
41 Although the fact situation did involve a waiver of counsel and a
plea of guilty, the statements relied upon in Hodge were clearly directed at
waiver of counsel. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948);
Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 7 n.5 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
42 See Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 6 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968);
Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1965).
43 WEBSsmW's NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY 575 (2d ed. 1950).
44 Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 8 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
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the court is not bound to accept it.45
Since the Johnson decision, a waiver has not been considered
valid unless it has been an "intelligent" waiver.46 The Ninth Circuit,
by imposing the necessity that the defendant understand the conse-
quences of his waiver, did not deviate from that rule, but merely
expanded upon the definition of "intelligent." Intelligence implies
understanding, and one cannot understand the meaning of a given
act without a knowledge of the possible consequences of that act.4 7
Thus, if a defendant is to make an "intelligent" waiver of counsel, he
must understand the possible consequences inherent in his act of
waiver.
The Right to Waive Counsel
As previously indicated, another important issue in Hodge was
the court's intimation by way of dicta that, under certain circum-
stances, no valid waiver of counsel could be made without the de-
fendant first having the assistance of counsel to advise him of the
propriety of such a waiver. 48 Thus, two rights, the right to counsel
and the right to proceed without counsel, come into conflict49 in a
situation in which a defendant does not understand the consequences
of his waiver but still insists upon his right to defend himself.
Although Johnson established the right to counsel and the neces-
sity of a valid Waiver to relinquish that right, it was not until the
case of Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann0 that the Supreme
Court declared the right of a defendant to waive his right to counsel.
In Adams, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the constitutional
right to counsel and the "correlative" right to proceed without coun-
sel.51  The Court stated: "[T]he Constitution does not force a
lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his ... right to assistance
of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
his eyes open. '52
In Brown v. United States5 the District of Columbia Circuit
interpreted the Adams case as stating that while the right to proceed
45 FED. R. CRim. P. 11. Additionally, the right to counsel is a constitutional
right, while the right to plead guilty cannot be so considered. Hodge v. United
States, No. 20,517, at 9 n.8 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
46 See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
47 See Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49
Mlix. L. REv. 1133, 1141 (1965).
48 Hodge v. United States, No. 20,517, at 8 (9th Cir., Mar. 5, 1968).
49 See id. at 11 (concurring opinion).
50 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
51 Id. at 279.
52 Id.
53 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
[Vol 20THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pro se may be a correlative of the constitutional right to counsel,
it is not itself a constitutional right.54  The court stated: "We find
nothing in the Constitution which confers it, or from which a guaranty
of such a right may be inferred. The truth is that the right is stat-
utory in character, and does not rise to the dignity of one conferred
. . . by the Constitution."55 The nature of the right to proceed pro se
often comes into question in cases involving the defendant's wish to
discharge counsel during the trial. It has been held that the court
has the discretion to refuse to allow the defendant to discharge coun-
sel under such circumstances. 56
Although the right to defend oneself, whether of constitutional
or statutory derivation, may not ultimately be denied, the constitu-
tional necessity of a valid waiver of counsel, under certain circum-
stances, might require that a defendant have counsel appointed
whether he wants it or not, to assist him in making his ultimate de-
cision.57 "[I]t may be that the defendant should always be fur-
nished counsel in the first instance, so that the benefits of legal
assistance might be described by someone other than the judge and
so that even a waiver can be shown to have been made upon the ad-
vise of counsel."58
The possible requirement that counsel be appointed for a defend-
ant before a waiver of counsel can be accepted has been crystalized
54 Id. at 365 n.2.
55 Id. at 365. The statute under which the right to proceed pro se
is granted is 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964), which reads: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage
and conduct causes therein." Contra, Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67,
71 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964)
("[T]he right to act pro se... is a right arising out of the Federal Constitution
and not the mere product of Legislation or of judicial decision").
56 See, e.g., Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940
(1963) (interpreting right to discharge counsel during trial as "qualified").
57 See State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 145, 426 P.2d 639, 642 (1967), where
the court, discussing the matter of ensuring the validity of a waiver of coun-
sel, states: "Under proper circumstances this may require the court to ap-
point counsel to conduct the defense despite the defendant's desire to defend
for himself." The defendant's inability to defend himself is discussed in
Potts, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Legal Aid or Public Defender,
28 TnxAs L. REV. 491, 500 (1950), where the author states: "Finally, it should
be strongly emphasized that the ordinary indigent defendant is incompetent
... to waive the assistance of counsel. He needs the assistance of counsel to
enable him to know how great is his need of counsel." See also Note, The
Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MumqN. L. REV. 1133, 1151
(1965).
58 Mazor, The Right to be Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar
Theme, 9 UTAn L. Ruv. 50, 76 (1964).
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in a tentative recommendation by an Advisory Committee to the
American Bar Association.59  Section 7.3 provides: "No waiver of
counsel should be accepted unless it is in writing and of record.
If a person who has not seen a lawyer indicates his intention to
waive the assistance of counsel, a lawyer should be provided to consult
with him. No waiver should be accepted unless he has at least once
conferred with a lawyer."'6 0 Thus, while the intimation in the Hodge
case that consultation with counsel may be necessary to permit a
finding of a valid waiver of counsel in certain circumstances is some-
what novel, there appears to be a movement in the direction of adopt-
ing such a requirement. The requirement of assistance of counsel
would appear to be a logical adjunct to the Ninth Circuit's emphasis
in Hodge on the understanding of the consequences of such a waiver.
It will be necessary, however, to await further decisions of the Ninth
Circuit to see whether it solidifies its pronouncements in Hodge and
hastens the trend in this direction.
In light of the incorporation of the sixth amendment into the
fourteenth so as to apply the sixth amendment to state criminal pro-
ceedings, 1 and the extension of the sixth amendment's guarantee of
the right to counsel to pre-trial stages of the criminal proceeding, 2
the pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit could establish a new trend
as to the proper means to be employed by the courts in determining
the validity of a waiver of counsel, both at the trial and at other
"critical" stages of the criminal proceeding, a trend which might
soon pervade the courts of the nation.*
J.B.M.
C. Nondisclosure of Evidence by the Prosecution-
Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
In Lessard v. Dickson' the Ninth Circuit was presented the issue
of determining whether there existed prejudicial error in a California
criminal proceeding because of nondisclosure of evidence by the prose-
cution. In deciding this issue in favor of the prosecution it would
59 ABA COMM. ON PROSECUTION Am DEFENsE FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS RELA-
TING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (Tent. Draft, 1967).
60 Id. at 62-63.
61 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
02 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
* Hodge v. United States was reheard en bane on January 21, 1969.
When this issue went to press, the decision had not yet come down.
1 394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
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appear that the majority of the court did not avail itself of an excellent
opportunity to establish a just and workable formula for determining
the existence of prejudicial nondisclosure of evidence.
A San Francisco summer school teacher, having just cashed a pay
check for $800, checked into a motel and crossed the street to a tavern
where he met and drank with a stranger, Albert Lessard. Just after
6:00 p.m. Lessard purchased a knife, returned to the tavern, and he
and the school teacher went to the latter's room. At 11:00 a.m. the
following day the teacher's body was discovered in his room. Les-
sard's fingerprints were found in the room, as well as a blood stained
shirt which was identified as the type that Lessard wore in the
tavern and in the store where he purchased the knife.2
An original coroner's report by a deputy coroner stated that the
death had occured 10 to 12 hours before the deceased's body was dis-
covered.3 The coroner later testified that, while the report repre-
sented such judgment as had been formed at that time, it was merely
an estimate, and that death could have occured as much as 14 hours
before the discovery of the body.4
There existed substantial evidence to the effect that Lessard had
left San Francisco on a bus for Seattle at 9:30 p.m. on the night of
the murder.5
The telephone operator of the motel told police that a man not
fitting the description of Lessard asked for the deceased about 6:00
p.m., that she called the deceased's room, and that he said that he
was expecting the visitor. The unidentified man then went to the
deceased's room.0
Two years after the murder, Lessard was found and brought to
trial. At the trial, at which a jury found Lessard guilty of murder,
testimony of the telephone operator was not introduced and defense
counsel was not informed of the operator's statements until after the
trial.7
After his conviction was affirmed on appeal,8 Lessard instituted
habeas corpus proceedings in the California Supreme Court. Lessard's
claims were made the subject of an evidentiary hearing before a
referee who found no merit in the claims. 9 The California Supreme
2 Id. at 89.
3 Id. at 92.
4 Id.
G Id. at 89-90.
0 In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 511-12, 399 P.2d 39, 48, 42 Cal. Rptr.
583, 592 (1965).
7 Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88, 90 (9th Cir. 1968).
8 People v. Lessard, 58 Cal. 2d 447, 375 P.2d 46, 25 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1962).
9 In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 507, 399 P.2d 39, 46, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583,
590 (1965).
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Court, in accordance with the referee's findings, denied the writ.10
The court stated that the police officers who had interviewed the
telephone operator considered her testimony unreliable and that the
prosecutor had likewise thought the testimony unreliable and, thus,
had not pursued the matter further. 1 In finding that there was no
suppression of evidence such as to constitute a denial of due process,
the California Supreme Court stated:
Due process does not require that officers, two years after the dis-
covery of information, must remember facts that have become stale
with time and that they must sua sponte disclose them to the peti-
tioner or his attorneys. We cannot find that the prosecution "delib-
erately suppressed" evidence which long before they had considered
to be unreliable or that failure to resuscitate such forgotten state-
ments "was a material deception and that there was knowledge thereof
on the part of the prosecuting officer .... 12
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the District Court for the Northern
District of California decided in accord with the California Supreme
Court. 3 Lessard then petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit followed the district court's treat-
ment of the case as "one in which the 'state-court trier of fact has
after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.' "14 The court
concluded: "Mrs. Gustavson's testimony, if it had been brought out
on the trial, would have materiality, but it could hardly be regarded
as being able to have much force against the inexorable array of
incriminating circumstances with which Lessard was surrounded."' 5
Judge Ely dissented from the opinion of the majority. 6 He
reasoned that there was not a proper hearing in the state court on the
issue of suppression, 17 and that the state court could not properly have
found that the evidence allegedly suppressed was "insufficiently ma-
terial or substantial."' 8 He further stated: "It seems to me that no
judge or group of judges has such omniscience as to enable him or it,
without a hearing and without having seen the witness, to reject
positively the claim that the evidence might have operated in favor of
the accused."' 9  He concluded that the prosecutor's motive in the
suppression is immaterial in determining whether the suppression
was harmful.2 0
10 Id.
11 Id. at 512, 399 P.2d at 49, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
12 Id.
Is See Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1968).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 93.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 94.
19 Id. at 95.
20 Id. at 93.
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The problem posed by the Lessard case is a difficult one which
goes to the basic theories of the nature of the adversary system.21
On the one hand, the prosecutor represents the state and is seeking
to enforce its laws; and on the other hand, he has a duty to see that
an accused receives a fair trial.22 The problem is to determine the
amount of evidence the prosecutor can disclose without violating his
duty to the state while, at the same time, not withholding such evi-
dence as would violate the rights of the accused.
A discussion of recent developments 23 concerning disclosure of
evidence must begin with the case of Brady v. Maryland24 in which
the Supreme Court stated: "We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prose-
cution. "25 The statement of the Supreme Court in Brady, while di-
rected at suppression of evidence following a request for disclosure
by the defense, has been used as a guide by other courts to determine
suppression questions even though no request for the particular evi-
dence has been made.26
The importance of Brady is that it makes the good or bad faith
of the prosecution immaterial to a determination of whether there
has been a wrongful suppression. Some cases involving suppression
of evidence have distinguished between those instances in which there
is bad faith on the part of the prosecution and those in which the
prosecution has acted in good faith.27  These cases examine the
prosecutor's error and apply different standards to determine the re-
sult according to the gravity of the prosecutor's act.23 If the prose-
21 See Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evi-
dence, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 858 (1960).
22 See id. and authorities cited therein; Note, Discovery and Disclosure:
Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal Procedure, 34 GEO. WAsH.
L. REv. 92 (1965) (see authorities cited therein).
23 For excellent discussions of prior history see Note, The Duty of the
Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 858 (1960);
Note, Discovery and Disclosure: Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role In Crim-
inal Procedure, 34 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 92 (1965); Note, The Prosecutor's Con-
stitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
24 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25 Id. at 87.
26 E.g., United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d
Cir. 1964).
27 United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1967); Kyle v. United States, 297
F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); Smith v. United
States, 277 F. Supp. 850, 860 (D. Md. 1967); Application of Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
28 "[T]he standard of how serious the probable effect of an act or omis-
March 1969] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cutor has knowingly used perjured testimony or has in bad faith
deliberately suppressed evidence, a reversal of conviction and a new
trial is given without any actual showing of prejudice.29 A showing
of prejudice, however, is the central requisite in cases involving
passive or negligent nondisclosure. 80
Other cases, better reasoned, point out that, even in cases of
negligent or innocent nondisclosure, the motive or state of mind of
the prosecutor should be immaterial.31 "Failure . .. to reveal such
material evidence... is equally harmful to a defendant whether the
information is purposely, or negligently, withheld."32  These cases
emphasize the importance of a fair trial rather than of a guilt-free
mind on the part of the prosecutor. 8 The Supreme Court has held
that good faith on the part of the prosecution in the case of deter-
mining whether there has been a fair trial, when evidence had been
erroneously admitted, is immaterial. 4 The same rule should apply
to erroneous nondisclosure of evidence. 35
Irrespective of the reason for suppression, not all suppressed
evidence will be found sufficient to warrant overturning the deter-
mination of the case. The courts have shown variation of language
in determining the type of evidence which, if suppressed, would
necessitate a new trial. The Supreme Court in Brady spoke in terms
of "material" 86 evidence and other courts have used materiality as a
criterion in cases of negligent suppression where no request for the
evidence has been made by the defense.s 7  Some courts have been
more specific in defining the type of evidence which must be disclosed
to ensure a fair trial. In Levin v. Katzenbach 8 the District of Colum-
bia Circuit stated that "appellant would be entitled to relief ... if the
government failed to disclose evidence which ... might have led the
jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt."30  In
sion at a criminal trial must be in order to obtain the reversal or, where
other requirements are met, the vacating of a sentence, is in some degree a
function of the gravity of the act or omission ... ." Id. at 514.
29 Smith v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 850, 860 (D. Md. 1967).
80 Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1961).
81 Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 299 (5th Cir. 1968); Ingram v.
Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846
(4th Cir. 1964).
82 Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964); see Note, Criminal
Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 19 OKIA. L.
REv. 425, 428 (1966).
88 Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966).
84 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963).
35 See Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1964).
36 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
87 E.g., Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
38 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
39 Id. at 291.
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Ingram v. Peyton4° the Fourth Circuit held that if the evidence "is of
a character to raise a substantial likelihood that it would have affected
the result if known at the trial, its nondisclosure cannot be ignored.141
A 1950 District of Columbia case4 2 emphasizes "the necessity of dis-
closure by the prosecution of evidence that may reasonably be con-
sidered admissible and useful to the defense."
43
These cases support the proposition that it is not necessary that the
petitioner prove that disclosure of the undisclosed evidence absolutely
would have changed the outcome of his trial, but rather that it is only
necessary that he prove the evidence might have had some effect on
the outcome, that it "might" have been instrumental. The point is
that it is not for the prosecutor to speculate as to the admissibility or
usefulness of the evidence,44 but instead, as the Ninth Circuit itself
has pointed out, the prosecutor is "required to present 'all the material
evidence' within [his] knowledge, irrespective of the source, even
though there appears to be sound reason to doubt its accuracy."45
Furthermore, when the evidence is exculpatory even to the slightest
degree, it is not for the appellate court to "speculate as to the effect
this testimony would have had on the jury if it had an opportunity to
hear it."146 Instead, the case should be remanded for a new trial.47
One fact evident in Lessard which is not mentioned either by the
majority or by Judge Ely is that the defense, as well as the
prosecution, apparently had access to the undisclosed evidence. That
is, the defense could have, and perhaps should have, questioned the
telephone operator at the motel. It has been held that "while the
prosecution has the duty to disclose, on its own initiative, exculpatory
facts within its exclusive control ... it has no such burden when the
facts are readily available to a diligent defender."48 It is argued that
40 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966).
41 Id. at 936.
42 Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
48 Id. at 993; accord, Link v. United States, 352 F.2d 207, 212 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966); Ellis v. United States, 345 F.2d 961,
963 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
44 Griffin v. United States,, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Note,
Criminal Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 19
OKLA. L. REv. 425, 427 (1966); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 148 (1964).
45 Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999, 1011 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 815 (1966).
46 United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.
1964).
47 See id.
48 United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236, 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 944 (1962); accord, Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 292-93 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (dissenting opinion); Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 54-55 (9th
Cir. 1965).
March 1969] CRMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
if a remedy is allowed by means of an allegation of suppression of
evidence which was also accessible to the defense, it will allow the
defense to be less than diligent in attempting to uncover relevant
facts.49
In opposition to the cases which hold that there can be no
suppression of evidence available to a diligent defense attorney, it has
been stated that "the possibility that appellant might have developed
this information without recourse to Government files or witnesses
* , . would not necessarily relieve the Government of its duty to dis-
close exculpatory evidence." 50 This latter view is to be preferred, as
the trial should not be viewed as a contest where the state, with its
manifold resources, is pitted against a defendant with admittedly
fewer, and sometimes meager, resources.51 It is not too great a bur-
den to place on the prosecution the duty of disclosing exculpatory
evidence.52
The evidence upon which Lessard was convicted did tend to
incriminate him rather persuasively. However, as Judge Ely points
out, the original deputy coroner's report stated that death occurred
after the time that Lessard allegedly boarded a bus for Seattle.53 In
light of the discrepancy between the original report and the coroner's
subsequent interpretation, there was some doubt as to the exact time
of death. It cannot be determined how much doubt this discrepancy
placed in the minds of the jurors, but it must have instilled some
doubt. The evidence which was not disclosed would definitely bolster
Lessard's claim of innocence, and might reasonably have instilled a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to his guilt. As Judge
Ely states:
Had this evidence been believed by the jury, [evidence of Lessard's
departure time for Seattle] and had there been acceptance of the
validity of the deputy coroner's original report as to the time of
death, the appellant could not logically have been held to have com-
mitted the homicide. In these circumstances, I must conclude that
49 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
50 Ellis v. United States, 345 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (concurring
opinion); accord, United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1967).
See also Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 298 (5th Cir. 1968); Levin v.
Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
51 See Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
52 Id. "A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's function is
to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's pursuit is justice, not a victim.
If it has in its exclusive possession specific, concrete evidence which is not
merely cumulative or embellishing and which may exonerate the defendant
or be of material importance to the defense ... the State is obliged to bring
it to the attention of the court and the defense." Giles v. Maryland, 386
U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J.) (concurring opinion).
53 Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88, 95 (9th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
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evidence that "an unidentified stranger," one other than the appellant,
had been allowed by the motel's telephone operator to proceed to the
victim's room during the crucial time period was significantly mate-
rial in support of the defense which was offered. 54
Judge Ely attacks the adequacy of the state evidentiary hear-
ing,55 but states that even if it is conceded that there was an adequate
hearing, he does not believe the California Supreme Court properly
could have come to the conclusion it did.56 This error on the part of
the state court would, under Townsen v. Sain,57 require a federal
evidentiary hearing,58 at which hearing seemingly the position of
Judge Ely should prevail. Thus, Albert Lessard would obtain a new
trial at which all the evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory,
would be presented.
In view of the cases reviewed that emphasize the effect which
nondisclosed evidence might have had on the defendant's case, rather
than the manner in which the evidence was suppressed, it would
appear that the dissent by Judge Ely is the more just position. In view
of the facts of this case, the position of Judge Ely is certainly more
logical. It appears that the majority of the court sitting in Lessard
did not take advantage of the opportunity to establish a sound and
just formula for determining what constitutes a prejudicial non-
disclosure of evidence, thereby aligning itself with a growing number
of courts which have done so. 59
J.B.M.
D. Definition of Insanity-Ramer v. United States,
390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1968).
It has been said that no issue in criminal law has attracted more
attention1 or been more controversia 2 than the defense of insanity.
The Ninth Circuit met en banc in Ramer v. United States3 for the
purpose of considering this important problem. The insanity test
used by the Ninth Circuit is based on the one it approved in Judge
54 Id.
55 Id. at 93.
56 Id. at 94.
57 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
58 The federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing if "the state
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole ....
Id. at 313.
59 See cases cited note 31 supra.
1 A. GoLDsTEiN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 3 (1967).
2 H. WEMOFEN, INSANTY AS A DEFENSE IN CamnqAL LAw 1 (1933).
3 390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Barnes' decision in Sauer v. United States.4 The instruction approved
there is not quoted in the Sauer case,5 but it is similar to the instruc-
tion approved by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United
States:6
The term 'insanity,' as used in this defence, means such a perverted
and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render
a person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or
unconscious at the time of the nature of the act he is committing; or
where though conscious of the nature of the act and able to distin-
guish between right and wrong, and know that the act is wrong, yet
his will, by which I mean the governing power of his mind, has been,
otherwise than voluntarily, so completely destroyed that his actions
are not subject to it, but are beyond his control.7
In essence, this is the M'Naghten Rules as embellished by the "irresist-
ible impulse" test.9 The Ninth Circuit has adhered to the Sauer test
since the case was decided in 1957.10 The issues presented in the cases
of Ramer v. United States and Church v. United States, however,
were considered sufficiently important that the Ninth Circuit was
called en banc to hear the cases together on March 25, 1968 and to
reconsider its definition of insanity.
Ramer committed a robbery of two Los Angeles banks on a
4 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
5 Id.; Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564, 581 n.5 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
7 Id. at 476-77.
8 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843):
"[T] o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."
9 The widely adopted embellishment of the M'Naghten Rule is referred
to here as the test of "irresistible impulse" only because that is the name
by which it is most generally recognized. It should be noted that the choice
of words is perhaps unfortunate and misleading. The phrase has been criti.
cized on the basis that it is limited to a description of spontaneous, sudder
feeling and does not take into consideration the type of impulse resulting
from brooding and reflection. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620-2.
(2d Cir. 1966); Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 940 (1957); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
See generally A. GoLnsTzmn, THE INSAIrrY DEFsES 67-79 (1967). Further-
more, the term has grown up as a popular phrase and was not used in the
test appearing in the important early American case of Parsons v. State, 81
Ala. 577, 596-97, 2 So. 8B4, 866-67 (1887), or in the test approved by the Su-
preme Court in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1895). The so-
called test of "irresistible impulse" is included in the Davis instruction, quoted
in the text accompanying notes 5 and 6 supra.
10 See Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1968); Kil-
patrick v. United States, 372 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 922 (1967);
Smith v. United States, 342 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1965).
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single afternoon. He had been drinking before the robberies and
went to a bar after he committed them, where he was found and
arrested by police. The trial resulting from these incidents marked
the third time Ramer had been tried for bank robbery. His defense
here was insanity. The testimony of Ramer's wife and mother, to-.
gether with that of two expert witnesses, clearly indicated a history
of emotional instability. 1  One expert, a clinical psychologist, had
administered tests to Ramer that indicated mental illness and prob-
ably schizophrenia.' 2 The other expert witness was Dr. Erric Marcus,
a psychiatrist, who said he thought Ramer knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong but probably could not control his will at the
time of the robberies. He said that Ramer was acting under "a
compulsion, a medical concept, which differs from an irresistible im-
pulse."' 3
In rebuttal the prosecution introduced the testimonies of three
FBI agents and Dr. Carl Von Hagen, a neurologist and psychiatrist.
Dr. Von Hagen testified that the information given him by Ramer
indicated the possibility that Ramer was in a fugue state at the time
of the robberies, which would have caused him to lose control of his
activities, as well as his conscious faculties. Due to Ramer's ability
to remember what had happened, though, Dr. Von Hagen indicated
that he doubted such a state existed at the time of the commission of
the robberies. He also testifed that Ramer knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong, that he was not acting under an irresistible
impulse, and that the robberies were not significantly related to com-
pulsive behavior.
In deciding the case, the trial court, sitting without a jury, felt
bound by the Sauer test and that, under the test, most of the defense
evidence was irrelevant. The judge also said, "I will take Dr. Von
Hagen's testimony and then I would have to find the defendant
guilty.' 14
Church, in the second case, was found guilty in the lower court
of aiding and abetting 15 another in the violation of a federal narcotics
law'0 by illegally importing and concealing heroin. He was also found
guilty of violating a federal statute17 for failing to surrender a nar-
cotics certificate upon entering the country. He and three others
drove to Tijuana, Mexico, to procure the heroin. They were all
11 Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1968).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 567 n.3.
14 Id. at 569.
15 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
16 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964).
M~arch 19691
THE HASTINGS LAW JOUJRNAL
arrested when they were caught with the heroin while crossing the
border to re-enter the United States. Church was tried and con-
victed, but after the conviction the court ordered Church to be exam-
ined, and upon examination he was found to be insane and was
committed for treatment. He was found later to be sane, was retried,
and again found guilty. As in Ramer's case, there was considerable
evidence to indicate that Church was mentally unstable. 8 He felt
some "hero worship" toward his older brother,19 and the defense's
theory was that he was acting under compulsion in obtaining the
heroin, in the deluded belief that he was somehow helping his brother.
Two medical experts testified in the Church case. One expressed
no opinion as to Church's insanity.20 The other, Dr. George Hollinger,
performed a series of tests on Church, which indicated schizophrenia
and a high manic reaction, showing a tendency toward impulsivity.21
On the basis of these tests, it was Dr. Hollinger's opinion that Church
had a schizophrenic reaction in remission at the time of trial and that
on the day he committed the criminal acts he was not acting in a
rational manner but in response to a deluded pattern of thinking that
he was accomplishing goals having little basis in reality.22
In both cases the lower courts used the insanity test approved
earlier in Sauer.23 On appeal counsel for both defendants objected
to the Sauer test and suggested the adoption of various tests used in
other circuits for the determination of insanity. After hearing both
appeals, however, the majority, through Judge Duniway, concluded
that neither case was appropriate for reconsideration of the test used
in Sauer. The majority explained that the lower court in Ramer's
case accepted the testimony of Dr. Von Hagen, who indicated that
Ramer was probably not in a fugue state at the time of the robberies.
Since no other basis was advanced by Dr. Von Hagen upon which
Ramer could have been found insane, Ramer would have been con-
victed under any insanity test, so the test used could not have
harmed him. The majority did not consider Church's case appropriate
for reconsideration of the Sauer test for the reason that the formu-
lation used there allowed for consideration of all evidence relating to
the defendant's sanity, and defense counsel at the trial expressly
stated that he had no objection to the instruction given.
Four members of the court disagreed with the majority position
and stated their views in two dissenting opinions. One of the dissents,
written by Judge Hamley and joined by Judges Merrill and Browning,
18 Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1968).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 570.
21 Id. at 571 n.8.
22 Id.
23 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
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urged that the hearings en banc provided an excellent opportunity
for the court to reconsider the merits of its test for determining in-
sanity. This dissent explained that both the lower courts felt bound
by the Sauer test. In Ramer's case this adherence apparently was
responsible for the trial court's rejection, in reaching its judgment, of
the defense's expert testimony as to Ramer's insanity. Dr. Marcus'
testimony that Ramer was acting under a compulsion different from
irresistible impulse was irrelevant as to the issue of insanity under
the Sauer rule. The minority felt that the evidence might have been
admissible if another test had been used, however, and such evidence
could have justified a finding of insanity under another test.
As to the facts of Church's case, Hamley's dissent went on to say
that a jury using the Sauer test of the M'Naghten Rule and irresistible
impulse would not have been justified in finding insanity. Under
some other tests, however, the trial court could have used the testi-
mony of Dr. Hollinger as a basis for finding Church to be insane.
Church's counsel stated at the trial that he had no objection to the
instructions given on insanity, but for him to object and seek differ-
ent instructions at trial would have been futile, in the minority's
view. Under the circumstances the "plain error" provision of Rule
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure24 should have been
invoked so as not to preclude counsel from objecting on appeal to the
instructions given.
Both dissents agreed that the Sauer test was outmoded and should
be replaced. The point of difference between the two opinions was
that one, written by Judge Ely alone, withheld recommendation of
any test for the present, while Hamley's dissent urged adoption of
the insanity test formulated by the American Law Institute:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect"
do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise anti-social conduct.25
Ramer v. United States has some significance for what it did not
decide. In refusing to adopt a new definition of insanity and over-
throw the tests of M'Naghten and irresistible impulse, the Ninth Cir-
cuit continues to follow Sauer and the Supreme Court case of Davis
24 FED. R. Cnm . P. 52(b): "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court."
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The provi-
sion was first introduced at the meeting of the American Law Institute in May
1955.
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v. United States.26  Probably the greatest significance of the case,
though, lies in its indications of an attitude of change, an attitude
that has been reflected in the federal court system generally in recent
years.
In 1957, when the Sauer decision was written, only one of the
eleven circuits had broken away from the test approved by the Su-
preme Court in Davis. This was the District of Columbia Circuit,
which had rejected the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests and
substituted a new test in Durham v. United States:27 "It is simply
that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect."28 This break from
the older rule presented few problems to the court in Sauer, though,
and it was able to dismiss the Durham test on its merits.29 Since
Sauer, the Durham rule also has been subjected to severe criticism by
other circuits.80 Furthermore, the District of Columbia Circuit's fail-
ure to follow the formulation approved by the Supreme Court could
be explained on the ground that the District of Columbia Circuit pos-
sessed greater autonomy than the other circuits.81
At the time of the Sauer decision only the Fifth Circuit had con-
sidered the insanity issue since Durham,32 and it had reached the
same conclusions as did the Sauer court.83 By the time the appeals
of Ramer and Church came under the Ninth Circuit's consideration,
however, many important changes had occurred. The test of M'Nagh-
ten and irresistible impulse had been discarded by the Third Circuit
in 1961 in United States v. Currens.3' The court there substituted
another test for insanity similar to the test of the American Law
Institute: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing
the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or de-
fect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
26 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
27 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
28 Id. at 874-75.
29 241 F.2d 640, 646-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
80 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 771 (3d Cir. 1961); see United
States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1967); Feguer v. United States,
302 F.2d 214, 243 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962).
31 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), where the Supreme Court
said: "Matters relating to law enforcement in the District are entrusted to the
courts of the District. Our policy is not to interfere with the local rules of law
which they fashion, save in exceptional situations where egregious error has
been committed." Id. at 476; Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 644 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
82 Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 643-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 940 (1957).
83 See Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
84 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
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ments of the law which he is alleged to have violated." 85
This rejection of the test of M'Naghten and irrestible impulse
was followed by the Tenth Circuit in 1963; 36 by the Second Circuit in
1966;37 and by the Seventh Circuit in 1967.88 When the Ramer case
came up on appeal, then, the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test had
been rejected by four circuits other than the District of Columbia,
including two since 1966. Of the remaining circuits, two had no re-
cent decisions on the issue, 9 and at least one other circuit recom-
mended a broad approach to the problem and adopted no single test.40
Only the Fifth Circuit had taken a position as strong as that of the
Ninth Circuit in supporting the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test,41
and even that circuit came within one vote of rejecting this test in
1963, when it reaffirmed its former position by an evenly divided
court.42 The Ninth Circuit itself indicated some willingness to recon-
sider the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test by its language in the
case of Maxwell v. United States,48 decided in 1966: "It may be that,
sooner or later, this court will again wish to review this general prob-
lem, last examined at length in the Sauer case, decided in 1957. How-
ever, we do not believe this should be done in a case such as this,
where the evidence as to any insanity was extremely meager ....
It was amidst this atmosphere of change and reconsideration that
Ramer was heard.
An attitude of re-examination was reflected by the court in
several distinct ways. The most obvious was the calling of the court
35 Id. at 774.
36 See Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
37 See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966).
38 United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1967). The courts
in both Shapiro and Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966), chose the alternative
word "wrongfulness" for "criminality" in the ALI definition. United States v.
Shapiro, supra at 686; United States v. Freeman, supra at 622 n.52.
39 These were the First and Fourth Circuits, as stated in Pope v. United
States, 372 F.2d 710, 737 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651
(1968).
40 Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 244-
45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962); Dusky v. United States, 295
F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962).
41 See Merrill v. United States, 338 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1964); Kittrell
v. United States, 334 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1964); Carter v. United States, 325
F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 927 (1965); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
42 Carter v. United States, 325 F.2d 697, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965).
48 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966).
44 Id. at 743.
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en banc for the express purpose of reconsidering the definition of
insanity previously accepted by the court. Another obvious indi-
cation of the court's attitude was the fact that four of its members
urged rejection of the Sauer test. This case was the fourth occasion
since Sauer that the issue of insanity had been raised on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit,45 but it was the first time that any of the members of
the court had voiced a desire to reject the test formulated there.46
The court's willingness to reconsider its position on an insanity
definition was also reflected in more subtle ways. The court in Sauer
found that the Davis decisions, where the Supreme Court declared
that an instruction on insanity embodying essentially the M'Naghten
Rule and a test of irresistible impulse was not error,47 was binding
on the federal courts so as to preclude them from formulating their
own tests for determining insanity.48  The Sauer court stated in re-
gard to this point: "If change there is to be, it must come from a
higher judicial authority, or from the Congress." 49  There is some
support for the view that circuit courts are not free to formulate
their own tests on insanity, principally from the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits,50 but this had been disputed by other circuit courts,51 and
statements from the Supreme Court decisions seem to imply that no
single test of insanity is required. For example, the instruction
approved by the Supreme Court in Davis used no "irresistible impulse"
language, but later, in Hotema v. United States,52 the Supreme Court
approved an instruction using the words "irresistible impulse.155
The issue of a criminal definition of insanity was last passed on
45 See Kilpatrick v. United States, 372 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 922 (1967); Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966);
Smith v. United States, 342 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1965).
46 See cases cited note 45 supra.
47 160 U.S. 469 (1895), 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
48 Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 650-52 (9th Cir.), cert. deniea,
354 U.S. 940 (1957).
49 241 F.2d at 652.
50 Smith v. United States, 342 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1965); Pope v.
United States, 298 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941
(1965); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
51 Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,
613-15 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767-71 (3d
Cir. 1961); see Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
In Pope the court said: "[W]e do not read the Supreme Court opinions
as holding that M'Naghten and irresistible impulse is the only permissible
approach to criminal responsbility. Nowhere do we detect such exclusiveness
in the Court's approval."
52 186 U.S. 413 (1902).
53 Id. at 417, 420.
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by the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon,54 decided in 1952. In that
case the lower court put the burden of proving insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt on the defendant, pursuant to Oregon statute.55
This was held not to be a violation of due process56 even though the
Davis instruction put the burden on the prosecution to disprove in-
sanity.57 Further doubt was cast on the view that the Davis in-
struction was to be strictly followed by the Supreme Court's language
that it did not require the instruction to include a test of irresistible
impulse, as the Davis instruction did. The Court in Leland said:
[C]hoice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowl-
edge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that
knowledge should determine criminal responsibility. This whole prob-
lem has evoked wide disagreement among those who have studied it.
In these circumstances it is clear that adoption of the irresistible
impulse test is not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'58
The view of the Sauer court that the Davis instruction must be fol-
lowed, then, is tenuous, and it is noteworthy that the court in Ramer
did not reiterate the view that the instruction approved in Davis was
binding. Furthermore, three members of the court expressly con-
sidered that Davis did not preclude the circuit courts from adopting
some other test of criminal responsibility.59
Another noteworthy aspect of the case was the court's refusal to
reach a conclusion on the issue of an insanity definition. The major-
ity opinion did not reach the point of reconsideration of the Sauer
test but instead affirmed the convictions of both defendants on the
grounds that the instruction given were not prejudicial and that the
facts of the cases did not present an appropriate occasion for recon-
sideration of the court's previous position. For the present, it must
remain a matter of conjecture what the view of the court would
have been had the definition of insanity been reconsidered. All that
can be said, on the basis of the court's conclusions, is that four
members of the court expressed the opinion that consideration of a
new insanity test was appropriate in this case, these four proposed
rejection of the rule in Sauer, and three of these four favored
54 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Since that time the Supreme Court has denied
numerous petitions for certiorari on the problem. E.g., Kilpatrick v. United
States, 372 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 922 (1967); Birdsell v.
United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965); Carter
v. United States, 325 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
55 ORE. Comp. LAWS, §§ 26-929, 23-122 (1940).
56 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952).
57 160 U.S. 469, 486-88 (1895).
58 343 U.S. at 801.
59 390 F.2d at 582.
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adoption of the test of the Model Penal Code as the appropriate
standard for determining insanity.
In conclusion, it cannot be said that the case of Ramer v. United
States is a landmark decision, for its principal effect is to reaffirm
the insanity test of the M'Naghten Rule and irresistible impulse, a
test well established in the Ninth Circuit.60 The case is important,
though, for its indication of what the Ninth Circuit may do at a
future time. As a result of the case it is no longer a foregone con-
clusion that the court will continue to adhere to its established po-
sition on the definition of insanity in criminal law. If Ramer, with
its strong dissents and a majority opinion declining to reconsider the
definition of insanity, has added anything to the antecedent law, it
has been to weaken the firm position of the M'Naghten-irresistible
impulse test as the exclusive standard for determining criminal re-
sponsibility in the Ninth Circuit.
M.S.C.
E. The Exclusionary Rule and the Identity of the
Searcher-Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d
61 (9th Cir. 1968); Brulay v. United States,
383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
The 1914 decision of the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States1 to exclude from the federal courts evidence seized by federal
officers in violation of the defendant's rights under the fourth amend-
ment2 was a pronounced change from the prior common law.3 The
most recent authoritative Supreme Court decision on the exclusionary
rule is Mapp v. Ohio4 in which the Court held not only that the
exclusionary rule applies to searches made by state officers but also
that it is mandatory state court procedure. 5 This apparently repre-
sents the ultimate expansion of the rule. However, as two recent
60 See Kilpatrick v. United States, 372 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 922 (1967); Smith v. United States, 342 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1965); Sauer
v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957);
Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 127 (9th Cir. 1956).
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
3 C. McCoRrmcx, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF EVmzNCE § 139 (1954).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 Id. at 655.
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Ninth Circuit cases, Brulay v. United StatesO and Wolf Low v. United
States,7 suggest, some question may remain as to the admissibility of
evidence seized by either foreign officers or private individuals.
In affirming the conviction of the defendant in Brulay, Judge
Russell Smith, speaking for the Ninth Circuit, refused to expand the
rule to exclude evidence illegally seized by Mexican police. Brulay
was arrested in Tijuana, because his car was "heavy in the rear" and
he appeared nervous when questioned.8 At the request of the police,
he opened the trunk of his car, thereby revealing 298 pounds of am-
phetamine tablets. Although possession of amphetamines was not at
that time a crime in Mexico, 9 the defendant was held and the evidence
turned over to United States officials. At the trial the defendant
sought to suppress this evidence on the ground that it was the result
of an "unreasonable"' 0 search and seizure. The Ninth Circuit's
affirmance of the admissibility of the evidence had two bases. First,
the function of the exclusionary rule is to alter future police prac-
tices. Since the Tijuana police practices would be unaffected by the
exclusion of the evidence, suppression would not serve its intended
purpose.' 1 Second, even though the court recognized that a con-
fession obtained by foreign officers in violation of the fifth amend-
ment would be inadmissible, 12 they felt there was a valid basis for
distinguishing between fourth (unreasonable search and seizure) and
fifth (self-incrimination) amendment violations.'8
The opinion in Wolf Low, written by Judge J. Warren Madden,
reached the same result as Brulay, ostensibly by stare decisis.14 In
this case the incriminating evidence was obtained by the Government
from an airline employee who became suspicious as he was checking
6 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 967 (1967).
7 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir.) petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S.
Aug. 2, 1968) (No. 371).
8 Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 347 (9th Cir. 1967).
9 Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, 19. Brief for Appellant at 8, 19, Brulay
v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
10 The search would be classified as unreasonable because it had been
conducted without a warrant or without "probable cause." Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1924).
"1 Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
12 Id.
18 Id. at 349 n.5.
14 "As an explanation we suggest that the law is violated in the Fourth
Amendment cases when the illegal search takes place. At that moment the
violation of the Constitution is complete. The fruits of the illegal search are
rejected not because the Constitution expressly requires it, but because it is
inappropriate to sanction the previous violations .... It is not until the
statement is received in evidence that the violation of the Fifth Amendment
becomes complete." Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir.
1967).
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the defendant's baggage. Employees later searched the bags but were
unable to identify the contents. Customs officials were notified and
they identified the contents of the bags as contraband and seized it
when the defendant later claimed his baggage. The defendant's mo-
tion to suppress this evidence as resulting from an unreasonable
search and seizure was denied, and the ruling was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit. This decision was based on the doctrine of a 1921 case,
Burdeau v. McDowell,15 which held admissible evidence obtained
by private parties acting without official sanction regardless of the
legality of the action whereby the evidence was acquired. The signifi-
cance of Wolf Low is its implicit holding that the doctrine upholding
private party searches established in Burdeau is unaffected by the
later decisions of Elkins v. United States", and Mapp.17
A short historical examination of the federal exclusionary rule
is necessary to determine not only whether Brulay and Wolf Low
reflect the modern basis for exclusion but also whether they are even
consistent with early exclusionary rule cases.
History of the Exclusionary Rule
The history of the federal exclusionary rule can be divided into
three periods. During the first period, from Weeks in 1914 until
Wolf v. Colorado8 in 1949, only evidence unconstitutionally seized by
federal officers was excluded. The fourth amendment protections
were held not to be applicable through the due process clause to the
actions of state officers. The emphasis during this period was on who
made the search, and the decisions enumerated three situations in
which the necessary "federal involvement" was found to justify the
exclusion of the evidence seized: (1) the state and federal officers
had a "general understanding" that the federal officers will use the
evidence;19 (2) the federal and state officers acted "in cooperation"; 20
and (3) the state officer's search was not made under any pretense of
enforcing state law but "solely on behalf" of the United States.21 The
15 See Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1968).
16 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
17 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
18 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
19 Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942); Sutherland v.
United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937); Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d
656 (7th Cir. 1932).
20 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927).
21 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Edgman v. United
States, 87 F.2d 13, 15 (10th Cir. 1936) (dictum); Aldridge v. United States, 67
F.2d 956, 957 (10th Cir. 1933) (dictum); Hall v. United States, 41 F.2d 54 (9th
Cir. 1930). See also Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172 (2nd Cir. 1928)
(Learned Hand, J.) (state police allowed to enforce federal law); United
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admission of evidence obtained independently by a state officer in
both the state and federal courts was a logical necessity because the
state officer was incapable of making a search that violated the fed-
eral Constitution.
The rule during the second period lacked such strong logical
justification.22 In Wolf the Court held that state officers were bound
to respect the guarantees of the fourth amendment because of the due
process clause.2 3 This holding, however, did not require state courts
to exclude evidence seized in such an unconstitutional search. Nor
did the extension of the fourth amendment to searches by state of-
ficers require exclusion in the federal courts of evidence seized
independently by them.24  Wolf and Lustig v. United States25 estab-
lished the period of the "silver platter" doctrine under which both
state and federal officers were bound to respect the fourth amend-
ment. If, however, federal and state officers used the same methods
to obtain evidence, only in the case of seizure by the federal author-
ities would the evidence be excluded.
The illogicalness of this position 26 and the manifest inadequacies
of the other remedies available to the person aggrieved by an un-
lawful search 27 led to the rejection of this doctrine and established
the modern rule. Elkins overruled this doctrine by name. 28  The
"imperative of judicial integrity" 29 required that evidence unconsti-
tutionally obtained, even by state officers, be inadmissible in the fed-
eral courts. Mapp v. Ohio set the present bounds of the exclusionary
rule holding it to be part of "due process" and as such applicable to
state court procedure.3 0 This modification of Wolf was necessary, the
Court felt, to prevent the courts from becoming "accomplices to the
States v. Jankowski, 28 F.2d 800 (2nd Cir. 1928) (Augustus Hand, J.) (state
police enforcing state law).
22 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-16 (1960).
23 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24 See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (dictum) (de-
cided the same day as Wolf).
25 Id.
26 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-16 (1960).
27 California was "compelled to reach that conclusion [that exclusion
was necessary] because other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance . . . ." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911
(1955). This language in Cahan has been quoted elsewhere. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960).
28 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 226 (1960).
29 Id. at 222. This phrase is used to express what Holmes had earlier
expressed, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
Consideration of the "imperative of judicial integrity" occurred as well in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
30 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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illegal act."8 1
Elkins and Mapp articulate the contemporary exclusionary rule
as it applies to governmental officers. The question then becomes
what persuasion these two holdings-and in fact the whole history of
the rule-should have in determining the applicability of the ex-
clusionary rule to searches by persons other than governmental
officers . 2
"Private" and "International" Silver Platters
An immediately apparent criticism of the restriction of the ex-
clusionary rule in Bruay and Wolf Low is that it establishes a "silver
platter" doctrine with respect to seizures by foreign officers and pri-
vate individuals. Since the silver platter doctrine has been re-
pudiated as applied to actions by federal and state officers, it ought
not to be reestablished for application to acts by foreign officers and
private individuals. This silver platter argument as applied to Brulay
and Wolf Low may be unsound in and of itself, however, since it
ignores the fact that Elkins and Mapp were decided on three bases,
only two of which are applicable to Brulay and Wolf Low.
The first ground of the Elkins case, the logical inconsistency
33
created by the silver platter doctrine of Lustig, would be unpersuasive
in arguing for exclusion in Brulay' and Wolf Low because a sound
argument can be made that the prohibitions of the fourth amend-
ment do not extend either to foreign officers or to private individuals.
If the searching officers are not bound to respect the fourth amend-
ment, the inconsistency disappears.84 This would make Brulay and
Wolf Low more analogous to the cases decided before Wolf v. Colorado,
in that the distinctions drawn in those cases35 establishing "federal
involvement" would still be applicable today in searches by either
private individuals or foreign authorities. The result is that the evi-
dence would have been excluded under these older authorities if the
defendant could prove, for instance, that the federal customs officials
and the Mexican police or private parties had acted "in cooperation."
31 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942).
32 "Justification for excluding privately seized evidence would appear to
parallel the reasons for applying the exclusionary rule to government."
Note, A Comment on the Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained by Pri-
vate Persons, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 271, 275.
83 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
34 That the officers are bound by the fourth amendment may be ir-
relevant. As Cardozo observes, "We exalt form above substance when we
hold that the use [of the evidence] is made lawful because the intruder
is without a badge of office." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585,
588 (1926).
35 See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
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The court in Wolf Low found, as a fact, that the requisite federal
involvement was not present. In Brulay this issue was not discussed
although it would seem to be clearly presented by the facts. Almost
directly analogous to Brulay is Gambino v. United States, 6 the lead-
ing case establishing sufficient federal involvement if the search is
made "solely on behalf" of the United States. In Gambino the de-
fendant's car was stopped and searched by New York officers without
probable cause, and the liquor found therein was confiscated. At that
time New York had repealed its state prohibition law, so the evidence
was offered in a federal prosecution. The Supreme Court in a unan-
imous opinion ruled that the evidence must be excluded.8 7 For the
Ninth Circuit to ignore such a clear analogy is plainly error.38
The second basis of the decisions in Elkins and Mapp was the
inadequacy of the remedies other than exclusion 9 available to pro-
tect fourth amendment rights.40 The most prominent of these "other"
remedies is a civil suit for either' trespass or invasion of privacy or a
criminal prosecution of the searcher.41 The Court found in Elkins
and Mapp, as had been pointed out by many writers,42 that the civil
remedy is generally limited to nominal damages. The emphasis
which the legal system places on large monetary judgments precludes
most of these cases from coming to court, and thus the searcher need
88 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
37 Id. at 319.
38 The Ninth Circuit seems persistent in its refusal to recognize the appli-
cation of Gambino in this situation. In a very recent case, Stonehill v.
United States, No. 22,346 (9th Cir., Dec. 9, 1968), the court affirmed a tax lien
foreclosure based on evidence seized in a raid. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines, prior to the federal prosecution, held that this raid violated a
constitutional provision exactly like the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Though the facts clearly showed Gambino in point, the
majority failed to distinguish that case but instead quoted Brulay approv-
ingly. In a meticulous dissent Judge Browning outlines what is the better
rule on this point.
89 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 218-22 (1960). For more precise objections to the "other" rem-
edies, see J. MAGuIE, EvDENcE OF GUILT 167-68, 177-80 (1959); Wolf, A Sur-
vey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 Gxo. WASE. L. Rav. 193, 211 (1963);
Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 153-54
(1948) (wherein the author questions whether exclusion should be viewed as
a remedy at all).
40 For a complete list of all "other remedies," both existent and proposed,
see J. MAGumE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 177-80 (1959).
41 Criminal prosecution similar to that under 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1964).
42 The obstacles are the same against private parties as against public
officials. Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 65, 72 (1957); Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58
YALE L.J. 144, 151 (1948).
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not fear civil litigation.43 Further, as to the possible criminal rem-
edy, there is a genuine reluctance on the part of the district attorney
to prosecute one who has helped his case.44  The other remedies
would certainly be no more adequate against a foreign officer than
the Court found they were against a state officer.
The other remedies are not so obviously inadequate as against a
private individual. There is no apparent reason to believe that the
district attorney would hesitate to prosecute a private person who
broke into another's house or car and thereby acquired the chal-
lenged evidence. However, one must keep in mind that the "private
person" most often connected with this type of case is the store
detective, the private investigator, or the campus policeman. These
"institutional private searchers" 45 are more than mere wrongdoers to
the district attorney; they are sources of evidence. His reluctance to
prosecute these people will be a practical reality.46 As for the civil
remedy, it would appear that the criminal defendant would have a
much greater chance of actual recovery against the department store
than against the generally "judgment-proof" police officer. However,
this fact does not negate the general cumbersome nature of the legal
system.47 The only conclusion is that the other remedies are as in-
adequate against the foreign officer or private person as they are
inadequate against the state police officer. This aspect of Elkins and
Mapp-inadequacy of alternative remedies-provides a strong argu-
ment for extending the protections of the exclusionary rule to the
defendants in Brulay and Wolf Low, thereby providing the effective
remedy necessary to protect their fourth amendment rights.
The Ninth Circuit avoided this argument in Brulay by construing
the Elkins case as establishing a "court-created prophylaxis" designed
to deter future unconstitutional police practices rather than to pro-
vide the defendant with a remedy. Since the admissibility of the
evidence in the United States courts would not affect the search
practices of foreign officials (or by analogy private persons), the court
concluded that the exclusionary rule should not apply.48  Since the
43 Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV.
65, 72 (1957); Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J.
144, 151 (1948).
44 Cf. Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J.
144, 152 (1948).
45 Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19
STAN. L. REv. 608, 617 (1967).
46 See generally Black, Burdeau v. McDowell--A Judicial Milepost on
the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932).
47 See Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J.
144, 151 (1948).
48 Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
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object of any search is to gain information, the use that could be made
of the information gained would seem to be, for the searcher, a very
relevant consideration in establishing search procedures. Thus, the
court's assertion that there would be no effect upon the Mexican
police practices resulting from an extension of the exclusionary rule
in the United States is at least questionable, and the argument, with-
out this assertion, becomes unpersuasive.
In all cases where the search is made by other than domestic
government officials, there is some degree of government cooperation,
even if this cooperation amounts to nothing more than the acceptance
of the evidence by the prosecutor. Does not allowing this evidence to
be used in court provide an incentive for the searcher to ignore the
Constitution? If the exclusionary rule were expanded to exclude
evidence seized in violation of constitutional standards by private
persons and foreign officials, this incentive would be removed. 49 While
this conclusion may be overstated, it is undeniable that the United
States Government should be in the position of encouraging the ob-
servance of fourth amendment rights rather than in the reverse posi-
tion.
Brulay and Wolf Low Fail to Recognize "Judicial Integrity"
The third ground of the Elkins"9 and Mapp decisions was the
"raising" of the exclusionary rule from a rule of evidence to one of
constitutional law. Exclusion of evidence unreasonably seized is an
inherent part of the fourth amendment, as exclusion of a coerced
confession is an inherent part of the fifth amendment.51 The language
of Mapp strongly supports such an interpretation:
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to
all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was
logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-
an essential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon .... 52
We find that ... the freedom from unconscionable invasions of pri-
vacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced confes-
sions do enjoy an "intimate relation".. . .53
49 One of the chief reasons stated in Elkins for overruling the silver
platter doctrine was to remove the "incentive" to violate the Constitution.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
50 This proposition is not flatly stated in Elkins, but it is clearly sug-
gested as the underlying rationale of the opinion. See id. at 222.
51 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961). However, exclusion in those cases may have been based
on the unreliability of the evidence rather than on a Constitutional prohi-
bition. See Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the
Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314, 1324 (1967).
52 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
53 Id. at 655-57.
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If the rule were this expansive, the prosecutor would have to prove,
prior to admission of the evidence, that each piece of evidence was
not obtained by an illegal search and seizure. Clearly the rule is not
this broad.5 4 However, limiting, as the courts do, the application of
exclusion to the single criterion that the searcher be a government
employee, ignores the basic justifications for the exclusionary rule as
shown above. The question turns then to the proper criteria which
should be utilized for determining when a search falls within the
Mapp exclusionary rule.
Criteria for Determining the "Status" of the Searcher
For determining the admissibility of evidence sought to be ex-
cluded by the defendant, a procedure could be established whereby
the defendant would be required to prove four facts: First, that the
other remedies available to the defendant against the searcher have
an inadequate deterrent effect; second, that the application of the
exclusionary rule in the particular case will have some proscriptive
effect upon future unreasonable searches; third, that the searcher
is an agent of the government or someone acting in place of the
government; fourth, that the interests of the defendant are adverse
to those of the searcher.
The first criterion, requiring that remedies available to the de-
54 Evidence of this is presented by the vast majority of American juris-
dictions which have held that Mapp did not overrule Burdeau v. McDowell.
See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); Frank v.
United States, 347 F.2d 486, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dictum), af'g 225 F. Supp.
573, 575 (D.D.C. 1964); Gandy v. Watkins, 237 F. Supp. 266, 270 (M.D. Ala.
1964); Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961); People v. Ran-
dazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 775, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (1963); Wright v. United
States, 224 A.2d 475, 476 (Ct. App. D.C. 1966); Knotts v. State, 243 Ind. 501,
187 N.E.2d 571 (1963); State v. Robinson, 86 N.J. Super. 308, 206 A.2d 779
(Super. Ct. 1965); People v. Trimarco, 41 Misc. 775, 245 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Tanchyn, 200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824 (Super. Ct. 1963).
Contra, Label v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958) (decided on the
basis of the fourth amendment alone, without Mapp); Del Presto v. Del
Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Super. Ct. 1966); Sackler v. Sackler,
33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61,
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1962). The only Supreme
Court case since Mapp that is nearly analogous to the present discussion is
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1964). The holding
in this case is obscured by the fact that Pennsylvania viewed this forfeiture
proceeding as civil and the Supreme Court construed it as "quasi-criminal"
and extended the exclusionary rule to such an action. Id. at 700. Thus there
is a question as to whether this represents any extension of the rule. See
Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53
53 VA. L. REV. 1314 (1967).
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fendant be inadequate, comes directly from Elkins. From the finding
in that case one might assume this criterion would be met in all
unconstitutional searches. Under present law this is probably true.
However, as has been suggested by at least one of the writers,55
statutory removal of the obstacles to an effective civil remedy would
strip the exclusionary rule of its most convincing justification.5 Such
a statute which provided for a large fine, recovery of attorney's fees,
and barred impeachment of the defendant as a witness on the basis
of his conviction through the use of the seized evidence, might pro-
vide the defendant satisfactory compensation. But the question
would remain for judicial determination whether this remedy was
sufficient to deter fourth amendment violations. If the remedy was
found lacking in this respect, exclusion should be allowed in spite of
the statute.
The second criterion, that exclusion must deter future violations,
is really the other side of the first criterion. If exclusion would
serve no such useful social purpose, its use cannot be supported
solely as a remedy. Conversely to the first criterion, the second
would appear to be met only in the case of search by domestic gov-
ernment officers. However, when a closer examination is made of
the actual searchers, it is seen that they generally have an interest in
the conviction of the defendant. 57 Further, they are usually institu-
tional searchers,5 8 conducting many searches, and hence are quite
cognizant of the rules of evidence. This criterion, like the first,
would leave substantial questions of fact for proof by the defendant.
The third criterion, that the searcher be serving a "governmental
function," is the only criterion presently applied by the courts. Even
in doing so the courts have taken a very strict interpretation limiting
it to actual government agents. Logic5 9 and good public policy would
seem to call for an expansion of this category to include parties acting
in place of the government. When the searcher has taken over the
functions of the state and is, in fact, acting in a quasi-public ca-
pacity,60 he should be bound by the fourth amendment. Some author-
ity for this view is found in Marsh v. Alabama.6 1 There the Supreme
Court held that when a corporation owned all the property in a town
and ran the functions of the town, the corporation is bound to respect
55 J. MAGUnE, EvmEzNc or GUILT 167-68, 177-80 (1959).
56 Id. at 167-68.
57 Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19
STAN. L. REv. 608, 614-15 (1967).
58 Id. at 617.
59 See note 34 supra.
60 Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19
STAN. L. Ruv. 608, 617 (1967).
61 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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the first amendment as is any public entity. Although the town in
that case had assumed a wide variety of public functions, the under-
lying rationale in Marsh seems applicable to the present discussion.62
In attempting to show that this third criterion was satisfied, the de-
fendant would have to prove that the searcher had taken over one
or more functions of the government. In the typical case of evidence
seized by a store detective, campus policeman or foreign official, the
defendant would have to show that the reason for the search was not
simply to recover the item stolen or to enforce some company or
campus policy, but rather to bring formal criminal charges.6 3
The fourth criterion, that the interests of the searcher be adverse
to that of the defendant, may seem specious on its face. It can be
said with certainty that courts would not under the present rules
exclude the challenged evidence if it was shown that the defendant
hired the searcher to get the evidence illegally and thereby "taint" it.
The purpose of making this a criterion is to make its proof a matter
for the defendant. In the majority of cases this proof would easily be
made by showing a basis, independent of agreement, for the search-
er's actions. Only in cases where the prosecutor could show some
business or personal relationship between the defendant and the
searcher would this be a relevant consideration, but in such a case it
would be very relevant.
Conclusion
When these four criteria for exclusion are applied to the common
cases of unreasonable search and seizure it is easily seen that evi-
dence obtained by private persons acting on their own initiative with-
out governmental direction would nearly always fail to meet the
criteria and hence would be admitted. Conversely, evidence obtained
by government agents would almost invariably be excluded because
such searches would satisfy all of the criteria. Thus, use of these
criteria would not alter existing settled law.
It is the cases between these two extremes, such as Brulay and
Wolf Low, which require the use of the criteria discussed in the pre-
ceding section of this note to determine the extent of the exclusionary
rule. Since, as established, these criteria are to serve the trial judge
in the determination of the prior facts bearing on admissibility, an
attempt to generalize as to foreign officers or private parties would
be self-defeating. It is possible to say, however, that Brulay and Wolf
Low represent a sidestepping by the Ninth Circuit of a very unsettled
issue.
G.R.H.
62 Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19
STAN. L. REv. 608, 617 (1967).
63 See id. at 614-15.
1000 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
F. Self-Incrimination in Tax Investigation Cases-
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1967).
In United States v. Cohen1 the Ninth Circuit was faced with new
questions concerning the extent of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in tax investigation cases. Cohen had given
all his tax records to his accountant, who drew up working papers
incorporating information taken from the records.2 Faced with an
impending tax investigation, Cohen obtained both the tax records and
the working papers from his accountant. 3 A special agent of the
Internal Revenue Service requested the accountant to ask Cohen for
the records, and the accountant complied.4 When Cohen declined to
return the papers, the agent summoned him to appear with his rec-
ords,5 and when Cohen refused to produce them, the agent filed a
petition with the district court to enforce the summons.( The dis-
trict court quashed the summons,7 and the Government appealed.
The attorney for the United States did not contest Cohen's right to
withhold his own tax records,8 but sought to force Cohen to produce
the accountant's working papers.9 Affirming the district court, the
Ninth Circuit declared that "as a general rule the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination permits a person in possession of
1 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967), affg 250 F. Supp. 472 (D. Nev. 1965).
2 Id. at 465.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 465-66 & n.1.
6 The petition was filed pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(a).
7 United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472, 475 (D. Nev. 1965).
8 Brief for Appellant at 32, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1967). On the basis of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), the
Government could have argued that Cohen had no privilege even for his own
tax records. In Shapiro the Supreme Court denied the privilege for records
required to be kept by the Emergency Price Control Act. The Court
stated that these records were required by law to be kept, and, therefore, the
defendant could not withhold them merely because they were incriminating.
Id. at 7, 34. Taxpayers, however, are required to "keep such records, render
such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regula-
tions as the Secretary or his delegate may from time to time prescribe." 26
U.S.C. § 6001 (1964). As "required records," taxpayers' records would seem to
fall within the Shapiro doctrine. As various legal writers have noted, how-
ever, the Government has been following a policy of allowing taxpayers to
assert the fifth amendment privilege for their own records. Redlich, Searches,
Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAx L. REV. 191, 194 (1954);
Weiss, Self Incrimination and Income Tax Investigations, 42 TAXEs 706, 707-08
(1964).
9 Brief for Appellant at 32, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1967).
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potentially incriminating papers to decline to produce them in re-
sponse to a summons ..... 1 Following this proposition, the court
allowed Cohen to retain the papers.
It was clearly established early in American judicial history"1
that the privilege against self-incrimination included not only the
privilege to refuse to admit to a crime,'1 2 but also the privilege to
refuse to give any information that would furnish a link in the proof
of that crime. 13 The Supreme Court later extended the privilege to
include the compulsory production of personal papers, stating,
"[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is sub-
stantially different from compelling him to be a witness against him-
self."' 4 The policies behind the fifth amendment privilege were
recently expounded in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:'5
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminaljustice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses .... 16
The controversy in Cohen centered around the fact that an
accountant had drawn up the working papers for his own use. Cohen,
one step ahead of the special agent, obtained possession of them.'7
Relying heavily on a California statute, 8 the government contended
that the papers belonged to the accountant and that Cohen held them
subject to the duty to surrender them to the accountant. 19 Further-
10 United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 1967).
11 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.C.D. Va.
1807).
12 The counsel for the United States was attempting to limit the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to answers which would in themselves con-
stitute confession of a crime. See id. at 40.
'3 Chief Justice Marshall stated: "Many links frequently compose that
chain of testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime.
It appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule that no witness is
compellable to furnish any one of them against himself." Id.
14 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
15 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
16 Id. at 55.
17 United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 465 (9th Cir. 1967).
18 CAL. Bus. & PRor. CODE § 5037, which states that in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary, the working papers are the property of
the accountant. The Government argued that the statute required an agree-
ment expressed either verbally or in writing, both of which were missing in
this case. Brief for Appellant at 41-46, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1967).
19 Brief for Appellant at,43, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1967).
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more, the accountant had requested Cohen to return the papers.20
Under these circumstances, the Government argued, Cohen could not
claim the privilege against self-incrimination.21 The district court
found that Cohen had "rightful and indefinite possession in a purely
personal capacity"22 and, considering this sufficient to invoke the
privilege, decided that it was not necessary to determine the question
of ownership.23 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in even
broader terms. The court reasoned that the policy of the fifth amend-
ment is to prevent the accused from being subjected to the "'cruel
trilemma' of perjury, contempt, or self-incrimination."24 Since pos-
session of incriminating documents sets the stage for this trilemma,
whether or not the possessor has title, the court concluded that pos-
session alone is "the necessary and sufficient condition of the priv-
ilege."25
The broad language which the Ninth Circuit uses in Cohen seems
to indicate that possession alone, 26 even wrongful possession, 27 is
sufficient to invoke the privilege and resist a summons by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. As authority for this position, the court cites
three district court cases:28 Application of House;29 Application of
Daniels;30 and United States v. Foster.3s The holdings in these cases,
however, do not seem to support a position as broad as that taken in
Cohen. In House the district court stated:
The argument of the government is therefore reduced to the proposi-
tion that the application of the privilege against self-incrimination
turns on the difference between rightful indefinite possession and
legal title. Nothing in the cases substantiates this notion that a
narrow concept of property law should determine the availability of
Constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination.3 2
Reviewing the Supreme Court cases dealing with the fifth amend-
ment and corporate records, the district court in Daniels held:
"These decisions make it clear that the privilege of the Fifth Amend-
ment does not rest upon an individual's absolute title to the docu-
ments in question; rather it rests on his legitimate and personal
20 Id. at 40.
21 Id. at 45-46.
22 United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472, 475 (D. Nev. 1965).
23 Id.
24 United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 469.
28 Id. at 468 n.10.
29 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
30 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
31 16 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5121 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
32 In re House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (emphasis added).
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possession.3 3  In Foster, the district court quashed an order issued
pursuant to section 7604(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,34 stating
that at the time the summons was issued, "the rightful, indefinite
and legitimate possession of such work papers was in the taxpayers
in a purely personal capacity . . . -35 These cases stand for the
proposition that one need not have legal title to incriminating docu-
ments in order to claim the privilege against self-incrimination as
long as one has rightful possession in a personal-rather than a rep-
resentative-capacity. House, DanieZs and Foster do not support a
position that possession alone, particularly if asserted in defiance of
the claims of the true owner, will support a claim of privilege.
Decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that as a matter of pub-
lic policy this broad view of the fifth amendment privilege would not
be followed. Discussing the policy behind the decisions that a bank-
rupt person cannot refuse to produce incriminating business records,
Justice Brandeis indicated in McCarthy v. Arndstein 6 that allowing
the privilege would destroy a property right, and the constitutional
privilege "does not relieve one from compliance with the substantive
obligation to surrender property. 37 In a 1933 Supreme Court case,
a juror claimed a privilege analogous to the fifth amendment privi-
lege.3 8 The juror had committed perjury in order to obtain a seat on
the jury. The court stated: "Assuming that there is a privilege
which protects from impertinent exposure the arguments and ballots
of a juror while considering his verdict, we think the privilege does
not apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently
begun or fraudulently continued."3 9 These decisions reflect a policy
that one cannot commit fraud or theft in order to put oneself in a
position to invoke a constitutional privilege. The language of the
court in Cohen seems to be contrary to this policy.40
33 In re Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (emphasis added).
34 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604 (a).
85 United States v. Foster, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5121, 5122 (W.D. Tex.
1965) (emphasis added).
36 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
37 Id. at 41.
38 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
39 Id. at 13-14.
40 The Ninth Circuit in the Cohen case does not explicitly reject the test
of rightful and indefinite possession in a purely personal capacity. In fact, the
court recognizes that Cohen's possession is rightful. See United States v.
Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1967). However, the court does not limit
its holding to cases involving rightful and indefinite possession, but holds that
"a person in possession of potentially incriminating papers" can claim the fifth
amendment privilege, and then qualifies the holding by saying that regard-
less of whatever exceptions exist, none would bar the claim by a person "in
possession, with the consent of the accountant, of work papers created by the
accountant. . . " Id. at 472.
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Other circuits, in cases similar to Cohen, have not allowed a per-
son in possession of his accountant's working papers to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination for those papers.4 1 The Sixth Cir-
cuit decided42 that if the accountant who had previously given the
papers to his client authorized the client to surrender the records to
the Internal Revenue Service, the client could not invoke the fifth
amendment privilege.43 Likewise the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled44 that if the accountant demanded the return of the working
papers, the client could not retain them even though they were in-
criminating.45 The court stated that "'one who holds papers against
the owner's demand for their return cannot resist production by
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination.' 46 These cases
from the District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits are distingushable
from Cohen, because in both of these cases the accountant considered
that he had some property interest in the working papers, whereas in
Cohen the accountant testified that he considered his interest in the
papers to have terminated when they left his possession.4 7 The broad
language used by the Ninth Circuit in Cohen, however, erases this
distinction. In all three cases the defendants had actual possession
of the incriminating papers. Using the test of bare possession, all
three defendants would have been able to assert the fifth amend-
ment privilege. Since this was not the case, these decisions of the
District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits can be considered to be flatly
contrary to the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the fifth
amendment privilege.
The peculiar twist to the Cohen case is that the facts, as they
appear in the decisions of the district court 48 and the Ninth Circuit,49
seem to fall well within the test propounded in House, Foster and
Daniels. Cohen's accountant at all times disclaimed any property
interest in the working papers.50 He stated that he had surrendered
them to Cohen with no expectation that they would be returned.51
41 In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961).
42 Id. at 385.
43 Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 467 (1965).
44 Id. at 740-41.
45 Id. at 741.
46 It was upon this basis that the district court distinguished Cohen
from Fahey and Deck. United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D. Nev.
1965), quoting Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 467 (1965).
47 Id. at 473-74.
48 United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 465, 470 (9th Cir. 1967).
49 Id. at 470 n.18.
50 Id. at 470.
51 Id. at 470 n.18.
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He had not demanded them from Cohen; he had merely passed
along the request of the special agent.52 From these facts it would
appear that Cohen had rightful, indefinite possession in a purely
personal capacity, if not actual ownership.
53
In this light the Cohen case is quite ambiguous. On its facts, the
case seems to be in line with other federal decisions which have re-
fused to limit the application of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to the person having both possession and ownership of incrimina-
ting documents. There is language in the case, however, which
indicates that the Ninth Circuit is attempting to formulate a new,
broader interpretation of the fifth amendment.5" If the court is
declaring that possession alone is sufficient to invoke the fifth amend-
ment privilege, then the ramifications of this new interpretation
have not been thoroughly considered. It would encourage bne faced
with criminal charges to obtain possession of any documents which
might incriminate him, even if this necessitates stealing them. The
government would be unable to force the production of these docu-
ments, and the owner might not want to go through a lengthy civil
suit to regain them.55 The protection of the fifth amendment should
not be extended to the point that law enforcement becomes crippled
without giving any legitimate benefit to the individual. Future courts
examining Cohen should limit the case to its facts rather than accept
an interpretation of the fifth amendment that does not reflect the
policies behind it.
B.C.A.
G. The Exclusionary Rule in Post-Conviction Proceedings-
Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803
(9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
In Verdugo v. United States" the Ninth Circuit was faced with
the problem of illegal search and seizure in a novel form. In July
52 The Government did not contest these facts, but argued instead thit
they did not change the effect of the California statute. See Brief for Ap-
pellant at 49, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
53 This was the line of argument used by appellee Cohen. Brief for
Appellee at 18-19, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
54 See United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468, 469-70 & n.17 (9th
Cir. 1967).
55 Nor, apparently, could the owner be forced to undertake a civil suit
to regain possession of such papers. Cf. Munroe v. United States, 216 F. 107,
112 (1st Cir. 1914). See also United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 366
(1950) (Black, J.) (dissenting opinion).
I No. 20,803 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968 (amended opinion). The original
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of 1964 Verdugo and his accomplice made an illegal sale of narcotics
and were later arrested.2 In October, however, federal agents made
an illegal raid on Verdugo's home, seizing a large quantity of heroin
and substantial sums of money.3 At a special hearing the district
court suppressed the evidence thus obtained,4 but the probation of-
ficer made it part of his presentence investigation report.5 Based on
that evidence, he concluded that Verdugo was a major supplier of
narcotics6 and should be given "'a substantial term of incarceration,
in excess of the minimum five year sentence required.'"7 Accord-
ingly, the trial judge gave Verdugo a 15-year sentence, whereas his
accomplice was given only five years.8 Affirming the conviction but
remanding the case for resentencing, 9 Judge Browning declared, in
the majority opinion for the court, that the fourth amendment sanc-
tion against illegal search and seizure and the exclusionary rule pro-
pounded in Mapp v. Ohio1° apply not only to trial proceedings, but
also to post-conviction procedure." In a separate opinion,' 2 Judge
Browning discussed the trial court's failure to disclose to Verdugo or
his counsel any part of the presentence investigation report.'3 Al-
though not part of the majority opinion, his discussion is closely re-
lated to the problem of search and seizure and may foreshadow the
course of future Ninth Circuit decisions.
Due Process and Post-Conviction Procedure
Traditionally, appellate courts have been reluctant to review
the sentence given to a convicted defendant, since this stage of a
criminal trial has been thought to be within the discretion of the
trial judge.14  These discretionary powers of the trial judge en-
decision came down on May 16, 1968, but after denying a petition for re-
hearing the court wrote an amended opinion which is the official reported
decision.
2 Id. at 1-3.
3 Id. at 14-16.
4 United States v. Verdugo, 240 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
5 Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 12 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id., quoting the probation officer's report.
8 Id. at 12.
9 See id. at 20.
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 36 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
12 Id. at 21-28.
13 Id. at 21-25.
14 George v. United States, 266 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 923 (1960); see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949); In re
Hodge, 262 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1958); Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
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compass both the length of a sentence and the procedure used to
determine it.15 He may consider evidence which would be inadmiss-
ible in open court,10 hear witnesses whom the defendant is not al-
lowed to cross-examine,' 7 and give the convicted defendant a sentence
substantially longer than that given another defendant for the iden-
tical crime.'8 As one federal judge stated, "The lack of constitutional
and evidentiary safeguards thrown around a convicted offender is in
striking contrast to those surrounding him before he is found
guilty.' 19
Although the discretionary powers of the trial judge are broad,
both the Supreme Court and the appellate courts have reviewed, and
sometimes reversed sentences in situations in which the trial judge
abused his discretion. In one case,20 the trial judge misread the de-
fendant's record and consequently gave him an unusually severe sen-
tence. Reversing the conviction as well as the sentence, the Supreme
Court stated, "it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence
on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner
had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would
provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process."21 In
another case22 the Supreme Court explicitly emphasized that a con-
victed defendant has a right to speak on his own behalf at sentencing 23
although it affirmed the conviction and sentence on the ground that
the defendant had apparently been given these rights.24  The Fifth
Circuit remanded a case for resentencing because the defendant had
been prejudiced at sentencing by his election to plead innocent at
trial.25 In a recent First Circuit case,26 a defendant who had secured
a new trial on appeal was given a longer sentence on retrial. Re-
15 See, e.g., George v. United States, 266 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 923 (1960), where the only limits that the appellate
court places on the trial judge is that the sentence be within statutory bounds.
16 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
17 See id. at 246.
18 The Ninth Circuit in Verdugo stated that this argument did not even
merit separate discussion. Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 12 n.13
(9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
19 Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1955).
20 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
21 Id. at 741.
22 Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
23 Id. at 304 (dictum). The Court stated that Rule 32(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure was based on the common law right of allocu-
tion. Id. The Court also specifically rejected the contention that having
defendant's counsel speak for him fulfilled this function. Id.
24 Id. at 305.
25 Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966); accord, United
States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
26 Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
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viewing a second appeal, the appellate court stated, "[i]n the ex-
ceptional situation, where it is evident that the district court has
given substantial consideration to legally impermissible factors, cor-
rection must be possible."27 Remanding the case, the court required
the trial judge to show "substantial justification" for the increase.2 8
Finally, in a case in which the defendant's plea for medical and
psychiatric examinations was ignored by the trial judge, the District
of Columbia Circuit declared, "[w]e do not question the general
rule that an appellate court will not ordinarily review sentences
that are within the statutory maximum. We hold only that the sen-
tencing judge should use some of the resources which Congress has
provided and that he may not arbitrarily ignore the data properly
obtained thereby."29 Taken together, these decisions indicate certain
due process requirements for post-conviction procedure which appel-
late courts may review on appeal.
Verdugo adds an important constitutional safeguard to post-con-
viction procedure by limiting not only the type of evidence the trial
judge may consider, but also the manner of its acquisition." Prior
decisions struck down sentences based upon substantively improper
considerations, such as false or misinterpreted information3 l or a de-
fendant's election to plead innocent at trial.3 2 In Verdugo, however,
there was nothing unacceptable with the evidence itself; rather, the
manner in which it was acquired was held to have violated due pro-
cess. This decision seems to be a definite break with the traditional
view that a trial judge is free to consider any evidence he may be
presented in order to arrive at a sentence which best fills the needs of
both the defendant and society.
The exclusionary rule on which the Ninth Circuit relied in Ver-
dugo3 3 has been developed gradually by the Supreme Court over the
last 50 years. First used as a sanction against federal officers in fed-
eral courts,3 4 it has been extended to state officers in state criminal
trials,3 5 to state forfeiture proceedings,3 6 and apparently even to ad-
27 Id. at 586.
28 See id. at 585.
29 Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (emphasis
added).
30 See Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 16-17 (9th Cir., Oct. 7,
1968).
31 See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); United States v. Myers,
374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
32 Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966); accord, United
States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
33 See Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 16-20 (9th Cir., Oct. 7,
1968).
34 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
85 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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ministrative proceedings under municipal housing codes.3 7 The Su-
preme Court's reaffirmance in Mapp v. Ohio38 of the proposition that
the exclusionary rule is of constitutional origin and not merely a rule
of evidence 9 was of particular importance to the Verdugo decision.40
If it were merely a rule of evidence, the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams v. New York 4l that the formal rules of evidence do not
apply to sentencing procedure42 would have called for the opposite
result in Verdugo. As a doctrine of constitutional origin, however,
the exclusionary rule applies equally to both trial and post-conviction
procedure.
The primary rationale" behind the exclusionary rule is that the
suppression of evidence illegally obtained will operate as a deterrent
to police officers by removing the incentive to make such illegal
searches and seizures.4 4 The Supreme Court, recognizing the neces-
sity of such a deterrent, has stated: "If letters and private docu-
ments can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures
87 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967) (application of fourteenth amendment implies application
of exclusionary rule).
8 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39 Id. at 649.
40 See Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 17 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
41 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
42 Id. at 247.
48 The majority in Verdugo relied solely on this deterrent effect rationale,
concluding "where ... the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing
would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seiz-
ures, that evidence should be disregarded by the sentencing judge." Ver-
dugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 20 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968). The implication
is that where there is no such incentive the evidence may be used. Many
cases follow this narrow interpretation of the exclusionary rule. See United
States v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1964), afid sub nom., Anglet v. Fay,
381 U.S. 654 (1965) (exclusionary rule not retroactive since incentive unaf-
fected); Billeci v. United States, 290 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Frank, 225 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1964) (rule not applicable to private persons
where police incentive unaffected). However, Judge Browning in his separate
opinion argues for a broader interpretation of the exclusionary rule as a pro-
tection for individual privacy and as a part of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Verdugo v. United States, supra at 25-28. See
Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1965). The Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), did not specify the exact basis for
the exclusionary rule, although Justice Black's concurring opinion supports
the broader view. Id. at 662. An earlier case refers to the exclusionary rule
as a protection of privacy. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
The distinction may become important in deciding whether or not other con-
stitutional safeguards will be extended to post-conviction procedure.
44 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. '45 As the court observed
in Verdugo, however, it is not adequate to exclude evidence from
the trial alone. 46 Once the police have secured by legal methods suf-
ficient evidence to convict the defendant, they have nothing to lose by
conducting a further illegal raid. If the evidence is not suppressed,
they may be able to convict the defendant on more than one count.
If it is suppressed, it can still be used in the presentence investigation
report to ensure that the defendant will be given a long sentence.
To carry out the policy of the exclusionary rule the courts must ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence from both the trial and the sen-
tencing stages.
From a practical standpoint, the exclusionary rule is even more
important at sentencing than at trial. A study by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts47 indicates that in fiscal 1966, of all
those defendants arrested and brought before federal courts, 75.5 per-
cent entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.48 These defendants
were concerned only with the post-conviction procedure and not with
the rules of evidence in criminal trials. Furthermore, in many areas
of federal criminal law and especially in narcotics violations, there is
a high rate of recidivism. 49 In such a situation, there is a great in-
centive for police to secure evidence ensuring long prison terms for
these defendants, since hasty release merely increases police work-
loads.5 0 If the exclusionary rule is not to apply to sentencing pro-
ceedings, then for three-fourths of all defendants in federal courts,
the fourth amendment has no meaning, since it applies only to a stage
of criminal proceedings which they have bypassed.
Verdugo and the Disclosure Controversy
The application of the exclusionary rule to post-conviction pro-
cedure raises new questions on the issue of disclosure of the pre-
sentence investigation report. If the defendant has the right to ex-
clude illegally seized evidence from the presentence investigation re-
port, it would seem to follow that he has the right to see at least
parts of the report in order to assert this exclusionary rule. Rule 32
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, allows the
45 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
40 Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 19-20 (9th Cir., Oct. 7,
1968).
47 ADiIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFrNERs IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1966).
48 Id. at chart 1.
49 Verdugo v. United States, No. 20,803, at 19 (9th Cir., Oct. 7, 1968).
50 Id. at 19-20.
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judge to withhold the report at his discretion from the defendant or
his counsel. 51 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has twice held that
due process does not require the trial judge to allow the defendant to
cross-examine witnesses and rebut allegations contained in the re-
port.52 As a result, many federal judges do not allow any disclosure
of the presentence investigation report to either the defendant or
his counsel.58  A study conducted in 19645- indicates that about 57
percent of the federal district judges permit no disclosure, 35 per-
cent regularly permit it, and the remainder do so only rarely.55 In
the Northern District of California where Verdugo was tried, the gen-
eral pattern is one of non-disclosure. 56
At present there are three steps in presentence investigation.57
First, the probation officer assigned to the case makes his investigation
and writes his report, based on the defendant's file and material ob-
tained by investigation.5 This is done either after the defendant
has been convicted or has entered a plea of guilty, or after the pro-
bation department has been notified that the defendant intends to
plead guilty and has signed a waiver requesting the probation of-
ficer to conduct his investigation.59 Then a supervisor who also has
the defendant's file reviews the probation report.60 Finally, the re-
51 In 1964 when Verdugo was sentenced, Rule 32 did not mention dis-
closure. FED. R. CalM. P. 32(c) (2), 18 U.S.C. Appendix, at 3759 (1964). In
that same year the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure offered an
amendment which read in part: "If the defendant is represented by counsel
and so requests, the court before imposing sentence shall permit counsel for
the defendant to read the report of the presentence investigation (from which
the sources of confidential information may be excluded) and shall afford such
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon." CoMm. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CRIINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT
COURTS 39 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1964). The Amendment was rejected,
and the present rule, as amended in 1966, states that the court "may disclose
to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report .... " FED. R. CR IM P. 32(c) (2).
52 See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) (adhering to the rule
in Williams v. New York but refusing to extend it); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949); cf. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
53 See 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 32-25, 32-26 & n.32.2 (1968).
54 Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REv. 12
(1964).
55 Id. at 15.
56 Interview with Robert E. Scott, Chief Deputy, United States Proba-
tion Office, in San Francisco, Sept. 18, 1968.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. Mr. Scott indicates that in a large, well-staffed probation de-
partment, especially in a big city, this is an effective review. However, in
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port is turned over to the trial judge who examines it before sen-
tencing the defendant. The judge may discuss some of the infor-
mation with the defendant, or show the defendant parts of the re-
port, or merely ask the defendant and his counsel if they have any-
thing to say before sentence is passed. As stated before, in many
cases the judge does not disclose any of the report to the defendant.
The position of the Division of Probation6' and of various legal
writers 2 is that the report is strictly confidential and should never
be disclosed to the defendant. Much of the information received by
the probation officer is given in confidence from sources such as the
defendant's family, his doctor, numerous welfare agencies, past em-
ployers and law enforcement agencies.6 3 The arguments are that
disclosure would dry up sources of information,64 provoke retaliation
by the defendant's associates against informants,65 disturb the de-
fendant psychologically, hindering the rehabilitation process, 66 and
finally, clog the courts with a deluge of frivolous appeals from trial
court sentences.6 7 The end result would be that the post-conviction
procedure would become another complete trial.68
Proponents of disclosure argue that the present system tends to
insulate the presentence investigation report from any really critical
or effective review.69 As a result, it is possible for errors in the
report which may substantially affect the sentence to go unnoticed.70
areas with a high turnover among staff, especially in rural areas, there may
be either a perfunctory review or none at all.
61 See ADuINIsTRAmIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, PuB. No. 103
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-5 (1965); Evian, Some Guidelines in
Preparing Presentence Reports, 37 F.R.D. 177, 181 (1964). Mr. Evjan is the
assistant chief of probations for the Administrative Office of United States
Courts.
02 See Barnett & Gronewold, Confidentiality of the Presentence Report,
26 FED. PROB. 26 (1962); Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must
Be Preserved as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROB. 3 (1964); Roche, The
Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY
L. REv. 206, 224 (1965).
63 A !)IIsTRATmIV OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, PuB. No. 103 THE
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 4 (1965).
64 Id. at 5.
65 Id.
66 Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investiga-
tion Report, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 206, 219 (1965); see Barnett & Gronewold, Con-
fidentiality of the Presentence Report, 26 FED. PROB. 26, 29 (1962).
67 See Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Pre-
served as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROB. 3, 4 (1964); cf. Brewster,
Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 86-87 (1965).
68 Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Preserved as
a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROB. 3, 4 (1964).
69 See Higgins, In Response to Roche, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 225, 228 (1965).
70 See Comment, The Defendant's Right of Access to Presentence Re-
ports, 4 Cpnvx. L. BULL. 160, 161 (1968).
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Furthermore, without some idea of the contents of the presentence
investigation report, the defendant's counsel is seriously hindered in
representing the defendant at sentencing.71 Finally, the probation
officer may be biased against the defendant and write an unfairly
prejudicial report.72 Although the vast majority of probation officers
are dedicated professional people, isolated cases of bias do occur.73
The present system of nondisclosure has made the federal de-
cisions dealing with due process requirements in post-conviction pro-
cedure confusing and contradictory. Some of these decisions give the
defendant the right to have counsel present at sentencing,74 the right
to be sentenced on the basis of an error-free record,75 without regard
to the plea he entered,76 and, by the Verdugo decision, the right to
have illegally seized evidence excluded from consideration at sen-
tencing. Other decisions, however, deny the defendant the right to
see the contents of the presentence investigation report and to know
what factors the judge considered in passing sentence.77 The result
is that the federal courts have given the defendant certain rights at
sentencing but have withheld from him the means to protect
these rights and make them effective. This situation is clearly un-
satisfactory.
Proposals
One proposal to reform the present state of post-conviction pro-
cedure is to amend Rule 32 (c) (1) to make the presentence investigation
mandatory in all federal felony cases.78 This is not actually such a
significant change. Discounting the special offenses of immigration
law violations, wagering tax violations, and violations of federal
regulatory statutes (which could perhaps be made exceptions to the
71 PRESIDENT'S Coi'N ON LAW ENFORcEmENT AND ADMnINSTRATIoN OF
JUsTIcE, REPORT Or TASK FORCE ON AD sINISTRAION OF JusTicE: THE CoURTs 20
(1967).
72 Comment, The Defendant's Right of Access to Presentence Reports,
4 CRnw. L. BULL. 160, 161 (1968).
73 See Evjan, Some Guidelines in Preparing Presentence Reports, 37
F.R.D. 177, 181 (1964).
74 See Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
75 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); see United States v. Myers,
374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
76 Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966); accord, United
States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
77 United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1967); see Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787,
790 (10th Cir. 1959).
78 The present rule requires the probation officer to make a presentence
investigation report unless the judge directs otherwise. FED. R. CRIm. P. 32(c) (1).
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mandatory report rule), presentence investigation reports are made
in about 89 percent of all federal convictions.7 9  Mandatory pre-
sentence investigations would not substantially increase the work-
load of the probation departments, and they would put an end to
much of the controversy"0 that has raged during the last few years
over the disparity in sentences given different defendants who have
been convicted of identical offenses. Since most differences in sen-
tences are undoubtedly justified,81 making these reports mandatory
would dispel much undeserved criticism directed at federal judges,
while providing a method for reviewing those sentences that are un-
duly severe or arbitrary.
Another proposal is for some form of mandatory disclosure of the
presentence investigation report. A trial judge should be allowed to
keep medical and psychiatric reports confidential, and also withhold
from the defendant the sources of various confidential reports and the
probation officer's recommendations. However, the defendant and
his counsel should be allowed to see the record of the defendant's prior
arrests and convictions, evidence gathered by the police and reported
to the probation officer, and the substance of any derogatory reports.
In this manner the presentence investigation report will be given a
critical evaluation which is much more effective than any adminis-
trative review.
One district judge who does use a system of disclosure similar to
that outlined above indicates that none of the disastrous consequences
predicted by the opponents of disclosure have occurred. 82 There has
been no evaporation of sources of information in his district in re-
taliation against informants, and no deluge of frivolous appeals. 83 In
the Northern District of California, where Verdugo was convicted and
sentenced, the Deputy Chief Probation Officer doubts that a system of
limited disclosure of this type would hamper the operation of his de-
partment to any significant degree.8 4  Thus, what little empirical
79 ADiVmI. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 48, table 21 (1966).
80 See, e.g., Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-a Constitutional
Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1965). Contra, Brewster, Appellate Review of Sen-
tences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1965).
81 Judge Brewster suggests that differences in lengths of sentences may
be due to personality traits of the different defendants which are not reflected
in their records. Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79,
84-85 (1965).
82 Thomsen, Confidentiality of the Presentence Report: A Middle Position,
28 FED. PROB. 8, 9 (1964). Judge Thomsen is the Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland.
83 Id.
84 Interview with Robert E. Scott, Chief Deputy, United States Probation
Office, in San Francisco, Sept. 18, 1968.
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information is available indicates that the fears of the opponents of
disclosure are quite ill-founded.
The use of the presentence investigation report has been a great
improvement over the system which placed the responsibility for sen-
tencing entirely on the trial judge. The presentence report provides
the judge with carefully gathered information upon which he may
base a sentence best fitting the needs of both society and the de-
fendant. As with any administrative procedure affecting personal
rights, though, it is subject to abuses unless properly controlled. A
system of mandatory disclosure provides this control and promotes
the fundamental concept of fairness inherent in our judicial process.
If a system of mandatory disclosure were established, the rights
granted to defendants by Verdugo could effectively be utilized. Until
then, the impact of Verdugo upon post-conviction proceedings will
vary with the resourcefulness and the effectiveness of counsel in as-
certaining the methods used in obtaining the evidence upon which the
presentence investigation report is based.
B.C.A.
H. Due Process in Post-Conviction Sentencing and Parole-
Padilla v. Lynch, 398 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1968); Sturm
v. California Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446 (9th
Cir. 1967); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585
(9th Cir. 1968).
Although persons convicted of crimes lose many of the rights and
privileges of law abiding citizens, it is established by now that they
do not lose all of their civil rights, and that the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment follow them into the
prison and protect them there from unconstitutional administrative
action on the part of prison authorities carried out under color of
State law, custom, or usage. More specifically, prison authorities are
not permitted to inflict upon convicts cruel and unusual punishments
for violations of prison rules; they may not discriminate invidiously
against a prisoner or class of prisoners .... I
In 1968, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided three cases
in which prisoners contended that adherence to these maxims was
lacking. The "prison authorities" involved in each case was the Cali-
fornia Adult Authority, and the "administrative action" involved was
of three types: redetermination of sentence,2 denial of parole,3 and
revocation of parole. 4 To establish the judicial climate in which these
1 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
2 Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967).
s Padilla v. Lynch, 398 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1968).
4 Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968).
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cases were decided, a review of the law concerning these three ad-
ministrative actions is in order.
Redetermination of Sentence
The power to redetermine a prisoner's sentence is part of the
broader power given to an administrative agency to determine a sen-
tence under an indeterminate sentence scheme.5 Under such a
scheme, the sentencing judge merely pronounces the minimum and
maximum terms fixed by the statute which the defendant has been
convicted of violating; 6 thereafter, the court's jurisdiction has ended,
and the administrative agency has sole authority over the execution
of sentence.7 Until the administrative agency fixes a definite term,
the sentence is deemed to be the maximum possible,8 and no prisoner
has the right to have his sentence determined at anything less than
the maximum.9 This is so even if the sentencing judge and prosecut-
ing attorney recommend a lighter sentence. 10 Once the adminis-
trative agency has fixed a prisoner's term at less than the maximum,
this action is only tentative,' and may be redetermined by the
agency "for cause,"'12 or "as conditions require,"'51 and the absence of
notice and a hearing before such redetermination does not violate due
process.' 4
A definitive statement on what constitutes sufficient "cause" for,
or what "conditions require," redetermination of sentence cannot be
found in the cases. In fact, a search of the cases for a holding that
"cause" was not sufficient is likewise futile. 5  Gainey v. Turner1
held that upon successful appeal of a conviction, a prisoner's rights to
5 E.g., CAL. PE. CODE § 1168.
e Id.
7 United States ex rel. Lashbrook v. Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 548, 550
(E.D. ]11. 1944).
8 United States ex rel. Palmer v. Ragen, 159 F.2d 356, 357 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 823 (1947); Ex parte Jordan, 190 Cal. 416, 212 P. 913 (1923).
9 United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Ragen, 146 F.2d 516, 517 (7th Cir.
1945); In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 293, 302, 425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr.
600, 604 (1967).
30 Hamrick v. Boles, 229 F. Supp. 570, 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1964); Silipolo v.
Ness, 90 F. Supp. 18, 19-20 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
11 In re Costello, 262 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1958).
12 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 360, 398 P.2d 361, 375, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 183 (1965); In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9
Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
13 In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 293, 302, 425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr.
600, 604 (1967).
14 In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824,
829 (1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
15 See, e.g., In re Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 797, 205 P.2d 662 (1949).
16 266 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C 1967).
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due process and equal protection are violated if credit for time served
on the invalid conviction is denied on a sentence following a sub-
sequent, valid conviction for the same crime. Although Gainey in-
volved sentencing by a judge, by analogy the same rule should apply
to an administrative agency vested with sentencing powers (e.g.,
the California Adult Authority). Thus, where a prisoner's conviction
had been overturned, and he was subsequently validly convicted, the
sentencing agency should be precluded from assigning any sentence
other than that originally assigned under the invalid conviction, minus
the time which the prisoner served under that first conviction. Such
a result would be consistent with the rationale of the Gainey case,
that a prisoner cannot be punished for successfully appealing his
conviction.
It bears repeating that no case has been discovered in which a
redetermination of a prisoner's sentence under an indeterminate sen-
tence scheme has subsequently been overturned by the courts. It
was against this judicial background that the following case was de-
cided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Sturm v. California Adult Authority17
Sturm and a co-defendant were convicted of first degree robbery
and sentenced to five years to life under the California indeterminate
sentence law. The Adult Authority thereafter fixed their terms at
six years. This determination was rescinded after Sturm had vio-
lated prison rules, and after Sturm had once more broken prison
rules,'8 the Adult Authority fixed his term at 10% years. He is now
serving the remainder of that 10 -year term, while his co-defendant
was released upon the completion of his six-year term. This case was
an appeal from an order of the United States District Court denying
Sturm's petition for habeas corpus.
Sturm's petition for habeas corpus was based on three contentions.
The first was that he was denied due process because the Adult
Authority, by redetermining his sentence after it had once been fixed,
acted outside its statutory authority under sections 3020 and 5077 of
the Califonia Penal Code. The court met this contention by quoting
the decision of the California Supreme Court in In re McLain: 19
[Conviction resulted in the] imposition of a sentence that was inde-
terminate, and until fixed, amounted to a maximum sentence pro-
'7 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967).
18 An examination of the complete record of the case fails to disclose the
specific prison rules that Sturm violated. The only description was the asser-
tion that the violations did not amount to felonies under the California Penal
Code.
'9 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (1960),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
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vided for the crime in question. When the Authority reduces a max-
imum sentence, its action, in the nature of things, is tentative and may
be changed for cause.20
The court went on to say that the California court has clearly recog-
nized the statutory authorization for the Adult Authority to redeter-
mine a sentence, and a state court's interpretation of its statute does
not raise a federal question.21
Sturm's other two contentions did raise a federal question. The
first was that the redetermination of his sentence at 101 years con-
stituted, in reality, a consecutive sentence of 4 years for violation
of prison rules. Sturm urged that this penalty was excessive and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment. The court met this contention by saying that the basic premise
of Sturm's argument, that his sentence for the original conviction
was permanently determined at six years, was incorrect. In addition,
[a]s noted previously, all indeterminate sentences are for the maxi-
mum, and any determination by the Adult Authority is only tenta-
tive.22 Therefore, it is not accurate to characterize the redetermina-
tion of the appellant's sentence as an imposition of any penalty for
the infractions, when the redetermined sentence was within the lim-
its of the penalty for his conviction.23
Sturm's second contention presenting a federal question was that
since his co-defendant had been released, his continued imprisonment
violated equal protection. The court met this contention by noting
that a major purpose of the indeterminate sentence law is to permit
individual treatment of offenders, and equal protection requires only
that state laws be applied uniformly to situations that cannot reason-
ably be distinguished. Sturm's two violations of prison rules made
his situation reasonably distinguishable from that of his co-defendant.
Judge Browning wrote an opinion in which he concurred with the
denial of Sturm's petition for habeas corpus, but criticized the rea-
soning of the court. He agreed with the court's opinion that the two
violations of prison rules were an adequate answer to the contention
that Sturm's continued imprisonment after the release of his co-de-
fendant denied Sturm equal protection. But then to answer Sturm's
due process argument 24 by saying that the redetermination of sen-
20 Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1967),
quoting In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824,
829 (1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
21 395 F.2d at 448, citing In re Costello, 262 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
22 To use the expression of the court, as noted previously in text ac-
companying note 20 supra, the rule included the phrase "and may be changed
for cause." It is omitted here.
28 395 F.2d at 448.
24 Sturm contended that the addition of 4Y years to his sentence for
prison rule violations was an excessive penalty and constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Judge Browning preferred to characterize Sturm's ar-
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tence was not an imposition of a penalty for the infractions "seems
inconsistent at the least."25
It was Browning's contention that the indeterminate sentencing
law and the provision that all sentences are to be regarded as for the
maximum should be considered as no more than a device for retain-
ing jurisdiction over the person of the defendant while transferring
the sentencing function from the judiciary to the administrative
agency. In any event, Browning went on to say, the indeterminate
sentencing law cannot be used "to validate whatever action the
administrative agency might subsequently choose to take, no matter
how seriously the appellant might be injured, and without regard to
whether the agency's action was arbitrary, basically unfair, or in-
vidiously discriminatory.' 26 Browning proposed the following exam-
ple: If Sturm had alleged that the Adult Authority had increased
the time he must serve from six to 60 years for a trivial infraction or
for no reason at all, and granting that Sturm's original sentence had
been five years to life, it would be no answer to a due process challenge
to say that since all indeterminate sentences are for the maximum,
and since 60 years is less than life, the Adult Authority's action could
not be questioned. He continued: "Appellant may have no 'right'
to be imprisoned for less than his whole life; but he is entitled to
have the time he must serve determined in a manner consistent with
the Constitution.127 Browning concluded by saying that since Sturm
revealed none of the facts about the prison rules he violated, nor any
of the circumstances surrounding those violations, which would be
essential to a review of the Adult Authority's actions, even after
being given an opportunity to amend his petition to correct this
omission, a denial of his petition for habeas corpus was correct.
Judge Browning's opinion eloquently pointed out the fallacies
involved in the court's reasoning. In effect, the court met the con-
tention that an administrative agency has exercised its powers in
denial of the rights of the prisoner by simply reaffirming the
powers of the agency, ignoring the possibility that such powers could
be exercised in an unconstitutional manner. There is implicit in the
court's opinion a denial of the validity of the principles announced
by the United States District Court in the quotation at the beginning
of this note.28
gument as contending that the 4 year addition to his sentence was "a result
so irrational and arbitrary as to violate substantive due process." Id. at 449.
25 Id. at 450.
26 Id. at 449.
27 Id. at 450. See generally Comment, Revocation of Conditional Lib-
erty-Caifornia and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 158, 174-75 (1955).
28 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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This implicit denial leads to the conclusion that the court is avoid-
ing issues. This conclusion is reinforced by what seems to be a
deliberate misinterpretation of the appellant's arguments by the court
in this case. First of all, the court answered Sturm's contention that
the Adult Authority exceeded its statutory authority (by redeter-
mining Sturm's sentence) with the quote: "When the Authority
reduces a maximum sentence, its action, in the nature of things, is
tentative and may be changed for cause."2 9 But then, in using the
same argument and authority to meet the more important due process
contention, the second half of the formula, "and may be changed for
cause," is omitted."0 This is significant because the court states that
the basic premise of Sturm's argument, that his sentence was per-
manently determined at six years, is incorrect. But this is not the
basic premise of Sturm's argument. The basic premise of Sturm's
argument is the requirement of "cause" before the Adult Authority
may redetermine a sentence, as declared by In re McLain.31 The
omission of the second half of the rule stated in McLain, when that
part of the rule was in point is, at least, strong evidence for the con-
clusion that both its omission and the misinterpretation of Sturm's
basic premise was deliberate.
Denial of Parole
In 1968 the Ninth Circuit decided Padilla v. Lynch,82 in which a
prisoner challenged the right of a parole board to deny him a parole.
The cases concerning the granting or denial of parole to a prisoner
are uniform in declaring that parole is a matter of legislative
clemency and grace.33 Denial of parole is not a violation of a prisoner's
rights,34 and does not raise a federal question.3 5 A major purpose of
parole acts, like indeterminate sentence acts, is to permit individual
treatment of offenders according to the best judgment of the paroling
authority, so the fact that other prisoners have been granted parole
affords no basis for a complaint by a prisoner when parole is denied
to him.36
29 395 F.2d at 448, quoting In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080,
1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
30 395 F.2d at 448.
81 55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (1960),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1961).
32 398 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1968).
33 E.g., Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1014 (1955).
34 Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
35 Ferchaw v. Tinsley, 234 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D. Colo. 1964).
38 Azeria v. California Adult Authority, 193 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 842 (1961).
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Padilla v. Lynch3
Padilla and his co-defendant received identical sentences of six to
ten years. After 312 years of imprisonment, the co-defendant was
granted parole, whereas after 72 years Padilla remained in prison.
Padilla alleged that the reason he was denied parole was because he
refused to divulge information about criminal activities of other
prisoners. He brought this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
contending that by the action of the Adult Authority in denying him
parole, he was denied equal protection of the laws, contrary to the
fourteenth amendment, and asking for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court
that Padilla failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and dismissed his petition. The reasoning of the court was that since
parole is a form of custody, citing Jones v. Cunninghaa,8 Padilla's
complaint was that the Adult Authority had refused to transfer him
from one form of custody to another. The court, citing Stiltner v.
Rhay, 39 continued, "This is not sufficient to state a claim under the
Civil Rights Act, because it does not allege a violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or statutes of the United States. '40
Judge Browning wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized
the position of the court as to the relation of parole and incarceration.
He said,
The reasoning appears to be that since parole like incarceration "is a
form of custody," nothing of significance occurs when a change from
one to the other is granted or refused, and therefore the denial of
parole to plaintiff in this case could not have violated any of his con-
stitutional rights thereby giving rise to a claim under the Civil Rights
Act.
In the real world incarceration and parole are vastly different
conditions. The parolee's status, whatever its limitations, has far
more in common with liberty than with imprisonment. When the
State grants, denies, or revokes parole it takes action which directly
and significantly affects the personal freedom of the accused, and the
State violates the Fourteenth Amendment whenever this action is
arbitrary, basically unfair, or invidiously discriminatory.41
Browning's opinion in this case, like his opinion in Stuzrm, points
37 398 F.2d.481 (9th Cir. 1968)..
8 371 U.S. 236 (1967). The question involved in this case was whether a
parolee was "in custody" so as to be qualified to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
89 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963). This case held that the Civil Rights Act
protects only rights secured by the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, but did not involve parole.
40 398 F.2d at 482.
41 Id. at 483.
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out that the court is answering a contention by the prisoner that an
administrative agency has violated his constitutional rights in the
exercise of its powers by simply reaffirming the agency's powers,
ignoring the possibility that the agency could carry out its functions
in an unconstitutional manner. Again, there is implicit in the court's
opinion a denial of the validity of the principles announced in Talley
v. Stephens 42 in its refusal to consider the main issue: Was there an
unconstitutional abuse of discretion on the part of the Adult Author-
ity? Furthermore, the court's position that parole and incarceration
are simply two different forms of custody is considerably weakened,
and Browning's position is conversely strengthened, in light of the
rule that upon revocation of parole, credit for time spent on parole
need not be employed to diminish the length of the remaining term.
43
Obviously, there is quite a difference between parole and incarcer-
ation.
Revocation of Parole
The cases involving revocation of parole are less consistent than
those involving the other two administrative actions under consider-
ation. It is generally stated that a parole board has wide discretion as
to parole revocation,44 that judicial review with respect to a finding of
parole violation is narrow and limited,45 that official revocation of a
parole is presumptively legal,46 that questions concerning the exist-
ence of parole violations and the sufficiency or reliability of infor-
mation upon which revocation of parole was based are matters within
the informed judgment and discretion of the parole board, and that a
court may not determine these matters anew or substitute its judg-
ment for that of the parole board.4 7  Perhaps the most, commonly
used phrase is that revocation of parole is within the discretion of the
parole board as long as the members of the board are not acting
capriciously. 48 Although there are cases to the contrary,49 the
42 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
43 Postelwait v. Willingham, 365 F.2d 759, 760 (10th Cir. 1966); Doherty v.
United States, 280 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1960).
44 United States ex rel. Bogish v. Tees, 211 F.2d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 1954).
45 Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 851 (1965).
46 United States ex rel. DeLucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435, 443
(N.D. III. 1948), alf'd, 178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 886
(1950).
47 Moore v. Reid, 142 F. Supp. 481, 483 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd, 246 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (denial of right to retained counsel). But see Hock v. Hagan,
190 F. Supp. 749, 751 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Washington v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp. 414,
416 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
48 Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d 56, 57 (10th Cir. 1954); see Fleming v.
Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (board cannot exercise uncontrolled dis-
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weight of authority seems to be that parole revocation must be based
on evidence of a violation of conditions of parole or the commission
of a new crime, 50 and the mere conclusion that the parolee is no longer
a good parole risk is insufficient. However, acquittal by a court of
the new crime is not binding upon the parole board, and revocation
may, nonetheless, be based on evidence of the commission of that
crime.51 It must be remembered that parole is statutory in that parole
has neither existence nor incidents except as statutes creating it pro-
vide,52 and the conflict among the cases is to some degree a reflection
of the differences among the parole statutes.
This consequence is especially apparent in the area of procedural
safeguards which are deemed necessary to protect the rights of a pa-
rolee in the revocation of his parole. The most important difference is
between those statutes which require that the parolee be given "an
opportunity to appear," 53 generally before the board, a member
thereof, or a designated representative, before his parole is revoked,
and those statutes which have no such provisions. It is generally
accepted that a court hearing is not required for parole revocation,54
nor is confrontation of the parole board's witnesses or sources of
information required. 55 It is also generally accepted that assigned
counsel and compulsory process for witnesses need not be provided
for the parolee at a parole revocation hearing. 6 Where the parole
cretion in parole by disregarding facts or refusing to hear arguments); cf.
United States ex rel. Howard v. Ragen, 59 F. Supp. 374, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1945)
(capricious exercise of power by parole officer violated due process).
49 See Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749, 751 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Washington
v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp. 414, 416 (M.D. Penn. 1960).
50 Compagna v. Hiatt, 100 F. Supp. 74, 82 (N.D. Ga. 1951); United States
ex rel. DeLucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435, 443 (N.D. l. 1948), aff'd, 178
F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 886 (1950); see Young v. Parker,
256 F. Supp 1002, 1004 (M.D. Pa. 1966). However, the board is not bound by
a finding of a parole violation, and it may continue the parolee on parole,
overlooking the violation. Birch v. Anderson, 358 F.2d 520, 527 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Brown v. Taylor, 287 F.2d 334, 335 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
970 (1961).
51 Fox v. Stanford, 123 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1941); In re Anderson,
107 Cal. App. 2d 670, 27 P.2d 720 (1951). But see In re Brown, 67 Cal. 2d
339, 431 P.2d 630, 62 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1967).
52 Wright v. Settle, 293 F.2d 317, 318 (8th Cir. 1961).
53 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1964).
54 Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967); Hyser v. Reed,
318 F.2d 225, 233 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). Contra,
People v. Moore, 62 Mict 496, 506, 29 N.W. 80, 84 (1886) (concerned revocation
of conditional pardon).
55 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
957 (1963).
56 Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 238-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Shiplett v. Wain-
wright, 198 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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statute does not require "an opportunity to appear" it has been held
that parole revocation without notice or a hearing is constitutional,57
although notice, hearing, and reasonable opportunity to rebut charges
are recommended to decrease the burden of judicial review. 5 Even
where a hearing is guaranteed by the parole act, it has been held that
th right thereto is purely statutory, and not constitutional.59 But
when "an opportunity to appear" has been guaranteed by statute, the
better-reasoned cases hold that this includes the right to have re-
tained counsel at the parole revocation hearing, 0 to present volun-
tary witnesses,61 and to have a hearing take place within a reasonable
time6 2 and in the district of the alleged violation 63 to ensure avail-
ability and competency of sources of information. Within the context
of this judicial history, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Eason v. Dickson.64
Eason v. Dickson
Eason was convicted of robbery and received the indeterminate
sentence of five years to life. He was paroled seven years later by
the Adult Authority. After two years his parole was suspended, he
was returned to prison, and his term was refixed to life. Within a
year a parole violation hearing was held. Eason pleaded not guilty
but was not allowed by the Adult Authority to give evidence, to call
witnesses, or to have an attorney. The Adult Authority found that
he had violated the conditions of parole, and revoked it. Eason then
brought suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act,65 seeking damages
and injunctive relief, contending that the California state statutes
which govern parole revocation are unconstitutional because they do
57 Curtis v Bennett, 351 F.2d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 1965); In re McLain,
55 Cal. 2d 78, 85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (1960), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 10 (1961).
58 In re Gomez, 64 Cal. 2d 591, 594 n.1, 414 P.2d 33, 35 n.1, 51 Cal. Rptr.
97, 99 n.1 (1966).
59 United States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen, 177 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1949).
60 Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 1966); Fleming v. Tate,
156 F.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Contra, Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp.
919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
61 Boddie v Weakley, 356 F.2d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 1966); Fleming v.
Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
62 United States ex rel. Obler v. Kenton, 262 F. Supp. 205, 208 (D. Conn.
1967); United States ex rel. Hitchcock v. Kenton, 256 F. Supp. 296, 300-01
(D. Conn. 1966).
63 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963). Contra, Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973, 974 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 927 (1965).
64 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968) (Chambers, Hamlin, Koelsch, J.J.).
65 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1964).
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not provide for a court hearing.66 Eason also contended that the
redetermination of his sentence to life imprisonment constituted
"multiple punishment."
The court met the second contention by reaffirming the power
of the Adult Authority to redetermine a prisoner's sentence within
the limits of the original indeterminate sentence, and by stating that
such redetermination does not constitute a penalty, citing the Sturm
case.67 The objections to this line of reasoning have been covered in
the discussion of the Sturm case.68
The court met Eason's contention that a court hearing is required
in order to revoke parole by saying:
This court was asked recently to pass on the constitutionality of the
California parole revocation procedure and the court concluded that:
"the appellant's contention has been tested in many litigated cases
and has always been rejected .... 69
When a search through the cases is made to determine the original
theory on which a court hearing is not required for parole revocation,
it turns up the following:
If the appellant's contentions were valid, the use by the states and
federal government of the beneficient practice of releasing prisoners
from the confines of the prison to the custody and supervision of pa-
role officers would be impracticable and would have to be abandoned.
The release from the confines of the prison would become substan-
tially equivalent to the discharge of the prisoner from his sentence,
and if, as in the instant case, the parolee denied either the fact of the
violation or the legal sufficiency of the act alleged to be a violation of
parole, the prison authorities would be required, in a hearing before
a judge, with all the concomitants of a non-jury criminal trial, to jus-
tify their resumption of in-prison custody of their prisoner.70
The argument of the court is based on practical rather than on
constitutional considerations. The theory seems to be that a court
hearing for parole revocation would take too long, that the parole sys-
tem would be so overburdened as to nullify its effectiveness. The
argument is one of expediency, and carries considerable force, since
the proposed effect of a requirement of a court hearing would result
in a drastic cutback in the number of prisoners being paroled. The
validity of this argument is further reinforced by the near unanimity
of the courts in rejecting the requirement of a court hearing for
revocation of parole, even in those jurisdictions which require an
opportunity to be heard.7 1 What is involved in a court hearing? Is
66 CAL. PEN. CODE § 3060 grants the Adult Authority "full power to sus-
pend, cancel or revoke any parole without notice."
67 Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1968).
68 See text accompanying notes 17-31 supra.
69 390 F.2d at 588, quoting Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir.
1967).
70 Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967).
71 See note 53 and text accompanying note 53 supra.
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it possible to cut out the time-consuming elements and still come up
with a procedure that will adequately protect the rights of the
prisoner?
There seems to be no objection on the basis of expediency to the
requirement of a hearing before the revoking authority, i.e., the parole
board. The federal parole board holds such hearings and there is no
evidence that they have been unduly overburdened.7 2 For the same
reasons, there seems to be no objection to affording the parolee notice
of the charges against him prior to the hearing. Besides a hearing
and notice, the District of Columbia Circuit requires that the parolee
be allowed to have retained counsel and to present voluntary wit-
nesses at a parole revocation hearing, and such hearing must be held
within a reasonable time and in the district of the alleged violation.
An informal hearing of this kind, unfettered by technical rules of
evidence (which seem to be the real basis for the rejection of a court
hearing on the basis of expediency), nevertheless affords the parolee
a great deal of protection and lends considerable aid to the parole
board by ensuring a more complete, more accurate picture of the
factors it must consider to reach its decision on whether or not to re-
voke. Furthermore, the requirement of such a hearing is not open
to attack on the basis of expediency, because it is in operation in the
District of Columbia with no evidence of an imminent breakdown in
the parole system.
What, then, is the explanation for the general reluctance of the
courts to require even a hearing for parole revocation, to say nothing
of holding such a hearing within a reasonable length of time, and in
the district of the alleged violation, with the assistance of counsel
and the right to present evidence? The objections to such require-
ments must be based on the reluctance of the courts to abridge the
discretion of the parole boards. The attitude seems to be that the
legislature has set up panels of experts to administer the parole sys-
tem; any interference with the discretion of these experts would
constitute judicial interference with legislative and executive (i.e.,
administrative) functions. With respect to this attitude of the courts,
the following is enlightening:
By the term "administrative discretion" is meant that the acts or
things required to be done may be reached, in part at least, upon the
basis of considerations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof
and at times which, considering the circumstances and the subject
matter, cannot be supplied by the Legislature itself. A statute is said
to confer such discretion when it refers the commission or officer for
the exercise of the power to beliefs, expectations, tendencies instead
of facts, the commission or officer being usually instructed to act, or
or to do the things required when deemed "fit", "proper", "appro-
72 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
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priate", "practicable", "necessary", "reasonable", or like terms. This
discretion includes all matters or things in which the ascertainment of
a fact is legitimately left to administrative discretion, which enlarges
as the element of future probability preponderates over that of pre-
sent condition .... 73
Given this explanation of the proper area for .. . administra-
tive discretion, the opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon in Hyser v.
Reed74 presents an appropriate resolution to the conflict between, on
the one hand, the principles announced in Talley v. Stephens,7 5 and
the appropriate procedural safeguards designed to assure adherence
to those principles, and on the other hand, the principle of adminis-
trative discretion. In that opinion Chief Judge Bazelon said that a
parole board performs two functions with regard to parole revoca-
tion: The first is the determination of whether or not there has been
a parole violation; the second is the determination of what to do about
it, once a violation has been found. In the performance of the second
function, the determination of what to do about a parole violation
once it is found, the exercise of discretion by the parole board is
particularly appropriate. It is at this stage that "the element of
future probability preponderates over that of present conditions,"
that decisions must be made "upon the basis of considerations not
entirely susceptible of proof or disproof," that the parole board must
refer to "beliefs, expectations, tenencies . . . to do the things re-
quired when deemed 'fit', 'proper', [or] 'appropriate'. .. ."
On the other hand, in the performance of the first function, the
determination of whether or not there has been a parole violation,
the exercise of discretion by the parole board is not particularly
appropriate. The "element of future probability" is not relevant.
The parole board must refer not to "beliefs, expectations, tendencies,"
but to evidence, to determine a fact which is as "susceptible of proof
or disproof" as any other fact sought to be established. It is in this
area that the procedural safeguards of a hearing with notice of the
charges, and the presence of counsel and voluntary witnesses, held
in the district of the alleged violation within a reasonable time, are
particularly appropriate, both for the protection of the prisoner's rights
and to aid the parole board in this determination.
Conclusion
Generalizations regarding the three cases do not come easily,
since the administrative action under attack is different in each case.
However, it is obvious that each case serves the same function in the
development of the law, that is, each reaffirms the earlier cases, the
73 Culver v. Smith, 74 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
74 318 F.2d 225, 248-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
75 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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old law. Aside from this, the only readily apparent similarity is that
each case involves what Kadish calls "the deliberate abandonment of
the legal norm after conviction"; 76 that is, the elimination of sub-
stantive and procedural standards to control the disposition of a per-
son after he has been convicted of a crime. In other words, each one
of these cases denies to some degree the principles in Talley v.
Stephens77 that the requirements of due process and equal protection
follow persons convicted of crime into prison.
Kadish lists two reasons for this abandonment of the legal norm.
One concerns the doctrine of administrative discretion, previously
explored in the discussion of the Eason case.78  The other is the
conception that the discretion exercised (in redetermining sentence,
in granting or denying parole, in revoking parole) consists merely of
whether the administrative agency will extend leniency to the
prisoner, which he may receive as a matter of grace, as a privilege,
but never as a matter of right.79
Perhaps the most important reason why the courts have adopted
this position is to counter the argument that the exercise of discretion
by an administrative agency in the three functions under consider-
ation is unconstitutional because the prisoner's sentence is uncertain,
or because such exercise of discretion is an invalid delegation of the
power to punish. That is, the courts counter such arguments by
asserting that, for example, an indeterminate sentence is really for
the maximum, and that any reduction is a matter of grace or leniency,
that such reductions are a privilege, not a right. But it must be
recognized that whether the grant of parole or the reduction of sen-
tence is a right or a privilege is irrelevant. The purpose of parole
and indeterminate sentences is to permit individual treatment of the
offender.80 This purpose "rests principally not upon the sentiments
of grace and charity, but upon the premise that the treatment of
individuals and the prevention of crime through the use of the crim-
inal law can better be accomplished through accommodation of the
kind and duration of authoritative disposition to the relevant char-
acteristics of the offender."8'
Thus the courts are caught in a dilemma. Because of the con-
76 Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretions in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904, 919 (1962).
77 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
78 Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretions in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904, 919 (1962).
79 Id.
80 Azeria v. California Adult Authority, 193 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 842 (1961).
83 Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretions in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARv. L. Rzv. 904, 921 (1962).
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stitutional requirements of definiteness of sentence, they are bound
by the concept of parole and reduction of an indeterminate sentence
as a privilege, a matter of grace. But this obscures the real purpose
of parole and indeterminate sentencing, and blocks any advancement
in the law to a full realization of the principles in Talley v.
Stephens.82
The only solution seems to be a case which presents something
close to Judge Browning's hypothetical. That is, presented with an
obvious abuse of discretion on the part of a parole board, the courts
would be forced to abandon the right-privilege facade, and face the
issue of what standards are necessary for the protection of the rights
of the prisoner against the abuse of administrative discretion.
J.P.M.
I. Discrimination in Prison-Toles v. Katzenbach,
385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967).
An action was brought by a Negro inmate of a federal peniten-
tiary in Washington to enjoin practices of prison officials which re-
sulted in "segregation in the housing of inmates and discriminaton in
work and other program assignments.!" According to prison policy,
an inmate was permitted to request an assignment to a specific cell,
but before he could be transferred there the assignment had to be
consented to by all the inmates of the cell requested. This policy
created a situation whereby a Negro prisoner could be subjected to
racial prejudice by white inmates of the cell to which the Negro had
requested transfer. It was alleged that this policy resulted in de
facto segregation of prisoners. On these facts the federal district
court rendered summary judgment for the defendants, and the plain-
tiff prisoner appealed.
After the filing of the action in the lower court, a policy state-
ment was issued by the Associate Warden of the prison:
POLICY:-With due consideration and respect for the rights and
privileges of all, irrespective of race, religion, or national origin,
there shall be no distinction made when assignment is made to hous-
ing, work, and other program areas.2
After the issuance of this statement, the plaintiff was given an inte-
grated job assignment. The practice as to housing, though, con-
tinued as before. Taking into consideration the changes that had
82 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
1 Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1967).
2 Id
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come about since the filing of the complaint, the Ninth Circuit in an
opinion written by Judge Merrill and joined by Judge Pope, affirmed
the decision of the lower court. The court concluded that the policy
statement rendered moot any claims made prior thereto and provided
the plaintiff with the remedy he sought. If the statement was not
adhered to, a new claim might arise. The court recognized, however,
that segregation was not ended by the policy statement alone, for
the prison officials continued to adhere to the housing policy of defer-
ring to the wishes of inmates already quartered in a specific cell. It
said, in addressing itself to this problem:
The question is presented whether this practice is to be tolerated. The
answer depends not on whether segregation results, but whether there
is acceptable reason for the practice.3
It determined that there was acceptable reason for segregation in
housing, since the practice was founded on interests of harmony,
security, and compatibility.
Judge Browning dissented from the decision of the other two
judges and concluded that the district court was wrong in rendering
summary judgment for the defendants. He stated that there was no
indication that racial segregation was required to meet the needs of
prison security and discipline and that more justification was needed
than the policy statement of the Associate Warden. Whether the
practices which preserved segregated cells were justifiable was a ques-
tion that could only be determined by a hearing by the trial court.
It is clear that prisoners are not entitled to all the rights accorded
ordinary citizens. An often quoted statement 4 on this issue is that
written by Justice Murphy in the Supreme Court case of Price v.
Johnston:5 "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."6 In the
interest of promoting prison discipline and security, prisoners are
denied rights or limited in their exercise of rights which they would
have outside of prison as a matter of course under the Constitution.
Among the rights and privileges that are recognized to be subject to
restriction by prison authorities are the right to use the mails, 7 the
3 Id. at 110.
4 Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1966); Sostre v. McGin-
nis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Childs v.
Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964);
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961); Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952); Washington v. Lee, 263
F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); United States
ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
5 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
6 Id. at 285.
7 E.g., Schack v. Wainwright, 391 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390
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right of access to materials for the preparation of legal petitions,
and the right to exercise freedom of religion.9 Courts have said
that they do not have the power to investigate and supervise matters
of internal prison discipline but that such matters are within the dis-
cretion of prison authorities.1 0 This view has been criticized,' but
it seems generally agreed that, except in extreme situations, courts
will not interfere with prison supervision 2 and that they will give
U.S. 1007 (1968); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Adams v.
Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948);
Medlock v. Burke, 285 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 1968); United States ex rel.
Henson v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965); United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); In re Smigelski, 185 F.
Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.N.J. 1960).
8 Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966
(1966); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 638-39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 862 (1961); Clements v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Ex
parte Wilson, 242 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Edmundson v. Harris, 239 F.
Supp. 359 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304, 307 (W.D. Mo.
1964); Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958). See generally
DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Henson
v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
9 Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 382
F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1967); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 595
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Lee v. Crouse, 284 F. Supp. 541, 548-49 (D. Kan. 1967); Ful-
wood v. Alexander, 267 F. Supp. 92 (M.D. Pa. 1967); Coleman v. Commis-
sioners, 234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964).
10 E.g., Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 887 (1966); Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 930 (1963); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 859 (1954); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949);
United States ex rel. Hoge v. Maroney, 211 F. Supp. 197 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
11 Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985, 986-87 (1962); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963).
12 E.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967); Vida v.
Cage, 385 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1967); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th
Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 943 (1968); Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966); Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487,
489 (4th Cr. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224
F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.), dismissed under Rule 60, 350 U.S. 890 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); Sharp v. Sigler, 277 F. Supp. 963, 968 (D. Neb.
1967); Murphy v. Surgeon Gen., 269 F. Supp. 227 (D. Kan. 1967); Cullum v.
Department of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Becket v.
Kearney, 247 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1965), aff'd sub nom., Becket v.
Blackwell, 363 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1966).
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great weight to the discretion of prison officials on these matters.13
On the other hand, it is also well settled that rights and protections
under the law are not entirely lost by imprisonment. 14 Incarceration
does not require the forfeiture of all rights, and included in the rights
retained by a prisoner are the constitutional rights of due process and
equal protection. 5 Some courts have emphasized the rights of pris-
oners and have adopted the view that prisoners retain all the rights of
citizenship except those expressly or impliedly taken by law.16 In
spite of the "hands-off"'7 attitude of courts generally where prison
administration is concerned, courts will intervene to remedy extreme
situations where the rights of prisoners are violated.'8 The court in
ToZes v. Katzenback, then, had to weigh the merits of two opposing
attitudes-one urging abstention by the courts in matters of prison
supervision and the other urging intervention where the rights of
prisoners are violated.
Complexity was added to the problem before the court by the
fact that the right alleged to be violated was the right of freedom
from racial segregation. Since the Supreme Court handed down the
case of Brown v. Board of Education," in which it declared segre-
gation in public schools to be unconstitutional, the spirit of that case
has been applied to various situations involving public facilities.20
13 SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D.N.Y. 1966); Ed-
wards v. Sard, 250 F. Supp. 977, 981-82 (D.D.C. 1966); see Abernathy v. Cun-
ningham, 393 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1968).
14 Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Jackson v. Bishop,
268 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791
(D. Kan. 1965); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Siegel v Ragen, 88
F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1949), affd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950).
15 Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Washing-
ton v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Talley
v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
Supp. 124, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill.
1948).
16 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944); Sigmon v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 908 (W.D. Va. 1953); Stewart v. State, 1 Md. App.
309, 316, 229 A.2d 727, 731 (1967).
17 See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judi-
cial Refusal to Review the CompZaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 n.4 (1963).
Is Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United
States ex tel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Ark. 1967). See generally
Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (state courtroom); Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (public restaurant); New Orleans City Park Im-
provement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, affg 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958)
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The law is now settled that racial discrimination in the operation of
any public facility is unconstitutional. 21 The unconstitutionality of
racial discrimination applies to the operation of prisons just as it does
to other public facilities.22 The problem remains, however, whether
racial separation is permissible in prisons where it furthers security
and does not amount to racial discrimination.
The importance of distinguishing between racial discrimination,
which is clearly unconstitutional, and racial separation, which is not
necessarily unconstitutional under certain circumstances, 23 was shown
most recently by the Supreme Court case of Lee v. Washington.24
In that case an action was brought, as in the Toles case, by a prison
inmate to enjoin alleged racial discrimination by prison authorities
in the administration of the prison where the plaintiff was incarcer-
ated. Alabama statutes25 required segregation of prison facilities,
and the federal district court declared that these statutes were un-
constitutional and set up a time schedule for desegregation of the
prison.26  On appeal to the Supreme Court the order of the lower
court was unanimously affirmed. It was claimed that the order did
not allow for necessities of prison discipline, but this claim was found
to be without merit. In a concurring opinion, however, Justices Black,
Harlan, and Stewart indicated that racial separation would not neces-
sarily be a violation of the Constitution in every situation. They
stated, "[P]rison authorities have the right, acting in good faith
and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial ten-
sions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons
and jails.127
It is evident that the problem before the court in Toles v. Katzen-
bach was an extremely difficult one, to be determined on the facts of
(parks); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, rev'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955)
(golf courses); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, aff'g 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir. 1955) (beaches).
21 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968);
Singleton v. Board of Comm'rs, 356 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[tlhe princi-
ple [of Brown v. Board of Education] extends to all institutions controlled or
operated by the State"); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala.
1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
22 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.
Ala. 1966); Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964); Edwards v. Sard,
250 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.D.C. 1966).
23 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1945); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)
(concurring opinion), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
24 390 U.S. 333 (1968), aff-'g 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
25 ALA. CODE tit. 45, §§ 4, 52, 121-23, 172, 183 (1958).
26 Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd, 390
U.S. 333 (1968).
27 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (concurring opinion).
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each individual case. Prison officials are obviously in the best posi-
tion to determine what measures are necessary for the maintenance
of prison security and discipline. Despite the superior knowledge of
prison officials, though, courts should not tolerate the denial of basic
rights to prisoners where that denial is not grounded on consider-
ations of prison security and the necessities of the execution of sen-
tence. The court in Toles was confronted with the problem of weigh-
ing the desirability of these two attitudes and thereby determining
how far courts should inquire into matters of prison maintenance
and discipline to determine whether a condition which limits or denies
rights to prisoners is capricious and discriminatory or justifiable in
the light of conditions of the prison community.28 The basis for mak-
ing this determination is indicated by the case of Edwards v. Sard,29
a case closely analogous to the Toles case. There, Negro inmates at
Lorton Reformatory in Virginia brought an action for injunctive re-
lief on a claim of racial discrimination in dormitory assignments.
The federal district court said that racial discrimination by public
authority could not be tolerated but, nevertheless, refused to enjoin
racial imbalance. The court relied heavily on the fact that, in the
opinion of reformatory officials, integration of all the housing facili-
ties would be highly dangerous.3 0 Segregation, then, was permissible
where it was required under the facts for the maintenance of prison
security.
The grounds for the decision in Edwards v. Sard indicate the
criterion for determining whether segregation in a given prison situ-
ation is permissible. In order to avoid an unconstitutional infringe-
28 The problem before the court was summed up well in United
States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1965):
"Prison discipline is essential and certain rights must be curtailed in order to
achieve it. But somewhere alone [sic] the line there exists a still finer line
that separates mere matters of discipline from arbitrary and capricious disre-
gard of human rights. It is this line for which federal courts must diligently
search while treading about in the twilight zone that separates interference
with a state's autonomy in policing its own penal system [autonomy of federal
officials in Toles] from the enforcement of federally guaranteed rights."
29 250 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1966).
30 The court stated: "Although the race of an inmate is a factor-in some
cases the determinative factor-in making dormitory assignments, this is so
only because prison officials believe that anything approaching total numeri-
cal integration would be highly dangerous, given the conditions of racial un-
rest which exist at Lorton .... The dangers of prison life, the extreme
complexity of the factors which must be considered in making dormitory
assignments, and the consequent difficulties in handing down any decree fa-
voring the plaintiffs in this case confirm the Court's belief that safety and
sound administrative practice demand that the opinions of conscientious
prison supervisors be given great respect when challenges of this kind are
made to them." Id. at 981-82.
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ment on a convict's rights, racial separation must be reasonably neces-
sary for preserving prison security. 1 It is recognized by courts that
rights may be curtailed for the sake of maintaining order, but rights
cannot be capriciously disregarded, and their curtailment must always
reasonably relate to prison discipline.3 2
Whether the Toles decision is a correct one depends on whether
prison practices resulting in segregation were reasonably necessary
in maintaining order. The Ninth Circuit stressed the justification
for the practices complained of. It said:
The practice is founded on interests of harmony, security, and the
compatibility of prisoners confined for long terms-all matters of vital
concern in prison operation. The practice in our judgment is a rea-
sonable means of furthering these interests. Under this practice the
fact that the interests are directly involved in a particular case is not
left to assumption based upon experience gained in other cases, but
is assured by inquiry in each individual case.33
In deciding whether practices complained of were acceptable in the
circumstances of the case, the court concluded, "The record answers
this decisively."3 4 As Judge Browning pointed out in his dissent,
however, all that was shown by the record was the promulgation of
the policy statement to the effect that assignments would be made
in housing and work without regard to race. This statement, though,
did not solve the problem complained of by itself. It did nothing to
alleviate the segregation problem caused by deferring to the wishes
of prisoners already living in specific cells before other prisoners
could be transferred there, and it disclosed no evidentiary basis for
concluding that the necessities of prison life demanded segregation
under the particular circumstances of the case.
The appellant prisoner alleged that in the three years he had
been in prison there had been no integrated cellhouses and that he
had been in a segregated cell since that time, although racially
allocated assignments were to continue only for the first three months
of imprisonment.3 5 Despite these allegations the district court found
for the defendants in a summary judgment. From the evidence dis-
closed by the opinion of the circuit court, it would seem that there
31 The criterion of necessity was offered by the American Law Institute
in its MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.1(1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962): "(1)
No person shall suffer any legal disqualification or disability because of his
conviction of a crime or his sentence on such conviction, unless the disqualifi-
cation or disability involves the deprivation of a right or privilege which is:
(a) necessarily incident to execution of the sentence of the Court .... 
32 United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637, 638 (E.D.
Pa. 1967); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 12
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
33 Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1967).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 110-11 (dissenting opinion).
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was not proper justification for the practices complained of. As Judge
Browning indicated, the proper course of action would have been to
grant a hearing to determine whether practices giving rise to segre-
gation were reasonably necessary to maintain order and security at
the penitentiary. In such a hearing the opinions of prison officials
should be entitled to great weight,36 and convincing proof of the
necessity of segregation should not be required of them.3 7 Some
justification, however, should be required.3 8  The evidence disclosed
by the written opinion seems insufficient to justify a denial of the
rights alleged to have been violated by the position of the prison
authorities.
The decision in Toles v. Katzenbach is in accord with the atti-
tudes expressed by the Ninth Circuit in prior decisions. Past deci-
sions have recognized that prisoners have at least some constitutional
rights3 9 and that among these are the rights of due process 40 and equal
protection.41 At the same time, though, the Ninth Circuit has also
recognized the wide discretion to be accorded prison authorities in
limiting convicts' rights in the interests of proper prison adminis-
tration.42  The most commonly recurring attitude on this intricate
problem is the assertion that it is not the function of courts to super-
vise the treatment and discipline of prisoners.43 Such a reluctance
to intervene where matters of prison discipline and security are con-
cerned indicates that in the future the Ninth Circuit will be likely
to continue to be willing, except in extreme cases, to leave matters of
30 See cases cited note 14 supra.
37 The requirement of convincing proof from prison officials was advo-
cated by a note on Toles v. Katzenbach in 46 TEx. L. REv. 800, 804 (1968).
38 Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALo L.
REV. 397, 417-18 (1965), where the author stated: "It must be recognized that
segregation of prisoners, when based upon actual probabilities of violence or
breach of prison discipline, are [sic] valid and necessary. But segregation for
its own sake is suspect, and reasons for such treatment should be required
of prison officials."
39 Mason v. Cranor, 227 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1955).
40 DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1966); Stiltner v. Rhay,
322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964); Hatfield v. Bail-
leaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
41 Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1957).
42 Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1964); Weller v. Dick-
son, 314 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
845 (1963).
43 Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir.
1957); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955
(1951); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
829 (1951); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1950). See gen-
erally Fleming v. Klinger, 363 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Mar-
chese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
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prison administration to prison officials, despite the possibility of un-
reasonable restrictions on the rights of prisoners by such a policy of
abstention.
M.S.C.
